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Abstract
Central bank independence is a multifaceted institutional design. The financial component has been 
seldom analysed. This paper intends to set a comprehensive conceptual background for central bank 
financial independence. Quite often central banks are modelled as robot-like maximizers of some 
goal. This perspective neglects the fact that central bank functions are inevitably deployed on its 
balance sheet and have effects on its income statement. A financially independent central bank 
exhibits the adequate balance sheet structure and earnings generation capacity to efficiently perform 
its functions. From a long-term perspective, as far as the demand for banknotes is maintained 
seignorage waters down any central bank financial independence concern. However, from a 
short-term perspective central bank financial vulnerability may condition its effective independence. 
Vulnerability may be real or accounting based. However, no matter its origin, institutional solutions 
are needed to minimize their impact. Adequate capitalization turns out to be a key issue. 
Alternatively, contingent capital in the form of institutional arrangements to bear central bank losses 
may be a (second-best) solution. The paper analyses in the context of simple VAR model the 
interplay between capitalization, accounting rules and dividend distribution.  This analysis is 
preceded by a thorough discussion of the risk-return profile of central banks net return on assets. 
Three main conclusions shape the input to the capitalization model. Central banks return on assets 
can be very volatile from a short term perspective. From a medium term perspective, natural 
earnings generation cycles dampen down volatility. On average, central banks net return on assets 
typically exhibits a discount over government debt financing cost. These observations shape the 
central bank financing planning problem as follows. Namely, the size of the discount relative to the 
social costs that would arise in case of a lack of central bank independence, along with central bank 
exposure to risks and the volatility thereof, determine the incentives of the government to maintain 
an excess of financial assets in the form of central bank capital. Actually, the working of smoothing 
mechanisms operating across time on central banks earnings leads to a distinction between 
short-term and medium term capital, i.e. the optimum capital solution is a band. In the same vein, 
the need to maintain optimal consistence between central bank financial strength and dividends 
distribution policy leads also to smoothing proposals for pay-out policy. The special nature of an 
independent central bank and the risks posed by inadequate accounting rules support a customized 
financial reporting regime for central banks.  Accountability is a crucial counterpart to 
independence also in the financial domain, and more especially with regard to cost efficiency since 
a pecking order for central bank capital favouring internal sources applies.  
71. Introduction
Central bank independence has become one of the central concepts in monetary theory and policy. 
Most economists agree that central bank independence is desirable because it helps to reach the long 
term goal of price stability.  The idea has also found confirmation in the fact that more and more 
countries in the OECD and beyond have made their central banks independent. 
Different theoretical arguments have been provided to justify central bank independence. Rogoff’s 
solution to time inconsistency problems in monetary policy has been credited as a necessary 
argument for central bank independence. Further analysis has challenged this view on different 
perspectives, although the positive assessment of insulation from the political domain is, generally 
speaking, maintained. An interesting departure from the seminal argument for central bank 
independence is Eggertsson and Le Borgne (2003), who defend it as the sort of institutional 
framework that allows the emergence of a body of professionals fit to perform a complex and 
long-term oriented task like monetary policy. Independently of its justification, the need to reconcile 
insulation from the political arena and sources of political sovereignty has also granted central bank 
accountability a prominent role in central bank theory and practice. 
The theoretical dispute on the factual determinants of central bank independence seems not to have 
found an expression in the statutory requisites for central bank independence. Practice and academic 
literature are almost unanimous in assessing central bank independence on the basis of a number of 
key factors, no matter if disagreements come to light on their degree of exogeneity. The following 
factual categories of institutional freedoms have been typically judged as characterizations of the 
degree of central bank independence: 
1. Legal independence 
2. Goal independence 
3. Operational independence 
4. Financial independence 
Legal, goal and operational factors that contribute to central bank independence have been 
extensively discussed in the literature due to their influence on monetary policy decision making. It 
is thus widely accepted that institutional features aimed at granting legal independence to the central 
bank must ensure its undisputed authority to fulfil a clear monetary policy mandate. In turn, this 
normally entails the adoption of central banker appointment schemes that intend to insulate their 
decisions from political meddling in normal times. 
Independence in the operational domain is understood to be equivalent to having wide discretionary 
powers to effectively implement monetary policy goals. Operational independence typically 
requires interest rate setting to be under the umbrella of the central bank. Exchange rate policy 
formulation tends to be a more contentious issue. However, no matter the legal attributions in place 
as regards monetary and exchange rate policies, their dual nature is understood to imply that 
conflict resolution procedures exist that endorse the priority of the central bank instrument. 
The wide coverage in the literature of factors striving central bank independence surprisingly 
contrasts with the limited attention that has been paid to determinants of central bank financial 
independence. This fact does not proof that central bank financial independence is unimportant. 
Rather it turns out to be the case that generic financial independence aspirations occupy a prominent 
role in most central banks’ statutes. Moreover, issues pertaining to central bank financial 
independence have reached the public debate in a range of countries, but most prominently in 
Finland, Japan and Switzerland. 
8The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to fill the existing gap on central bank financial 
independence issues. A good starting point to achieve that goal is a comprehensive definition of 
central bank financial independence. One that emphasizes its ultimate purpose has been proposed 
by Stella (2002). A financially independent central bank or, equivalently, a financially strong 
central bank is one that possesses sufficient resources to attain its fundamental policy objectives. 
This notion of central bank financial independence can be reformulated in the following equivalent 
terms. A financially independent central bank exhibits the adequate balance sheet structure and 
earnings generation capacity to efficiently perform its functions. Similarly, the central bank 
financial independence domain can be understood to encompass the study of any disturbing 
influence on central banks optimal behaviour due their financial “corporeity”. 
The definition is intentionally broad. Ultimately, its breadth is a reflection of the complex nature of 
real-world central banks, unlike assumptions made in standard monetary policy models that tend to 
represent them as robot-like maximizers operating in some “vacuum”. Such broad perspective 
allows to systematically deal with a range of potential constraints for central bank behaviour due to 
their financial materiality, i.e. to balance sheet and income statement driven effects. 
Dealing with central banks balance sheet adequacy requirements in its entirety is outside the scope 
of this paper. Any abstract discussion on this topic can just with big difficulties descend to practical 
recommendations. They quickly become shadowed by the influence of a myriad of institutional and 
contextual issues. However, it is still very relevant to ask whether a sort of Modigliani-Miller 
irrelevance proposition applies to the composition of central bank assets. A negative answer, as it 
turns out to be the case from a theoretical perspective, sets a very general reference for the 
discussion of central banks financial shape. However, the fact that monetary policy effectiveness is 
based on its impact on financing conditions in the margin leads in practice to ample scope for 
diversity in central banks balance sheet profiles. 
Asset composition determines to a large extent a central bank’s risk-return profile. The naïve notion 
prevails that central banks enjoy a stable and voluminous source of earnings. Admittedly, this may 
be largely so most of the time. That explains why central banks have traditionally been a political 
target under the fiat money era: the extraction of rents derived from their monopoly over money 
production (seignorage) entails no apparent costs. To a large extent, the process towards central 
bank independence amounts to a ward against those temptations. Independence statutes have 
recognized the need to preserve such primary dimension of central bank financial independence. 
However, the scope for financial-mediated political influences is not limited to direct recourse to 
central banks’ vault. Free decision making by an otherwise independent central bank could be 
jeopardized if financial vulnerability on its side might transform it into a ductile sort of institution. 
Notice that decision making distortions by a financially vulnerable central bank might arise even 
without explicit external interference. Self-restraint in the adoption of monetary policy measures 
which, if implemented, could drive the central bank to a situation of financial distress may also be 
an indirect source of lack of independence. 
From this perspective, this paper deals with the sources of central bank vulnerability as well as 
mechanisms needed to cope with it.  The position is held that outright central bank capitalization is 
the optimal solution, although it also highlighted that enforceable contingent capital1 may also be a 
second-best alternative. A model of central bank capitalization is proposed on the basis of its 
capacity to offer a cushion against political meddling in moments of central bank financial 
weakness.  The model balances in a VAR-like optimization framework the social costs of having to 
                                                     
1 The term contingent capital refers to institutional arrangements between the government and the independent central bank whereby the 
former assumes the enforceable commitment to cope with central bank losses if they ever take place.  
9yield to government’s pressures in exchange of fresh funds in a situation of financial weakness, 
against the financing costs of the extra debt needed to fund central bank shares. Both excess and 
deficit of capital have proved to be in practice a problem for some central banks. Balance sheet 
structure proves to play a key role in the solution.  
The model intends to be realistic in the representation of a central bank chief financial officer’s 
problem. From a policy perspective, the main conclusion of the model is that the society has to 
endow the central bank with the capital necessary to efficiently perform its duties. From a practical 
perspective, the model formulation and the discussion of sources of central banks financial 
vulnerability preceding it can serve as a guide of issues arising in central bank financial planning. 
Therefore, the paper places substantial emphasis on the discussion of the conceptual issues 
surrounding any central bank risk budgeting exercise. 
Financial vulnerability can be real or just apparent. As regards the second alternative, it is well 
known that accounting policies may play an important role either to moderate or to exacerbate 
earnings volatility. As a confirmation of this observation, some central banks have lately needed to 
adjust their accounting policies in order to limit the accounting-driven unreal perceptions of 
vulnerability. The paper also focuses on the different roots of central bank real financial 
vulnerability: un-hedged currency exposures, interest rate risks, banknote-driven balance sheet 
volatility, contingent commitments that belong to the core duties of central banks, services 
provision without a cost recovery policy etc. In other words, central bank financial vulnerability is 
determined by the inter-temporal risk-return profile that arises from a complex set of central bank 
on- and off-balance sheet exposures. The emphasis on the inter-temporal perspective is crucial. It 
allows differentiating between apparent and real financial vulnerabilities and determines the 
band-like nature of the optimal capital solution as well the dividends smoothing proposition. 
Once an optimal degree of central bank capitalization has been justified, a closely linked problem 
arises. It is, so to say, the reverse side of the central bank equity problem: namely, a solution must 
be found to the problem on how to distribute central bank profits so that the legitimate rights of its 
shareholders to receive dividends and the central bank capitalization optimum are compatible. 
The apparent lack in practice of single solutions to the central bank financial structure and policy 
problems can be justified on different practical grounds, but most particularly on the existing 
diversity of accounting models for central banks. With one exception, this paper does not take a 
position on central bank accounting issues. It takes for granted that accounting should reflect the 
economics of the institution that it intends to portray.  However, consistent with this assumption, a 
defence will be made of a particular divergence of central bank accounting from conventional 
standards, so that financial independence becomes a feasible goal. Namely, the feasibility of the 
capitalization optimum can be just safeguarded if distributable profit does not necessarily 
encompass all income generated. The rationale for this argument is straightforward: whereas 
general purpose accounting principles are aimed at serving decision taking by managers and 
shareholders, the very definition on an independent central bank, based on the negation of 
government involvement in its operations, supports the construction of a distributable profit metrics 
that leaves no margin for some erosion of central bank strength. A joint implication of this departure 
from general purpose accounting principles, together with the existence of earnings generation 
cycles for some central banks, will be some degree of profits smoothing. 
An essential counterpart of having independence from the government is accountability. Financial 
independence involves special transparency and accountability requirements. Some of them will be 
highlighted as appropriate in the paper. Actually, financial accountability concerns implicitly 
underlie the fact that the problem discussed in this paper is currently a topical one. The adoption by 
central banks of financial reporting practices originally conceived for commercial financial 
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institutions, like accounting standards close to market value ones, has magnified the image of 
central banks as financial vulnerable entities. This being said, it is nevertheless important to 
emphasize that the whole range of challenges posed by central bank financial and/or operational 
accountability are outside the scope of this paper. In this regard, compliance with cost efficiency 
benchmarks is of particular relevance because central bank financial independence hinges on a 
pecking order that stresses the importance of internal sources of central bank capital. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a short conceptual “excursion” through 
monetary economics, with the focus placed on fiat money: its backing, its inherent inflationary bias 
and its institutional solution, i.e. central bank independence. Section 3 identifies the main 
financial-based risks to central bank independence. Section 4 deals with the interplay between 
central bank mandate, earnings generation capability and financial vulnerability. Section 5 develops 
a simple Basel-like model of central bank equity and discusses its practical implications. Section 6 
deals with profit distribution, accounting and consistency conditions with the solvency rule. 
2. From Monetary Economics to Independent Central Banks: A Short Theoretical Excursion 
2.1. Money and central bank corporeity 
The basis that defines central bank activity is obviously money. Although purely from a formal 
perspective, it is nevertheless relevant to start the discussion on central bank financial independence 
raising the question on the material resources that central banks need to perform their core activity 
around money. Notice that, at this very initial stage, central banks main function is considered to be 
the one also defining the object of modern monetary economic modelling: namely, how to ensure 
that fiat money is valuable in the economy. 
One may identify in the literature three main different strands of monetary economy modelling 
approaches: search models, overlapping generation models and turnpike models. These different 
paradigms manage to rationalize on different grounds –money as a medium of exchange, money as 
a store of value and money as a unit of account– the fact that, although otherwise useless, fiat 
money is still valuable.  However, in these models central banks play almost no role at all. One 
might be tempted to conclude from that, that the confidence capital inherent in monetary economies 
is totally alien to the existence or absence of central banks and, more specifically, to their very 
materiality. 
However, a contribution by Kocherlakota (1998) offers new light on the existence of money and, 
implicitly, on the fundamental role of central banks around money. Kocherlakota (1998) 
demonstrates that the paradigms of money mentioned above are just descriptive explanations of the 
functions of money. An explanatory account of the role of money in the economy and its broad 
acceptance is rather based on a fundamental technological contribution: namely, money is a 
record-keeping device, in the precise sense that it permits to efficiently summarize for economic 
purposes the most basic aspects of past transactions in the economy. 
Again, no explicit role for central banks or for central bank capital is evoked in Kocherlakota’s 
theoretical contribution. Probably, an overlapping-generations model for money with a central bank 
should be the right set up to tackle issues linking dynamic confidence in money and central bank 
structure. However, factual precedents (see reference below to the Rentenmark case) lead to guess 
that, even this avenue leaves a scarce margin to pin down central bank capital in a pure theoretical 
frame. Nevertheless, Kocherlakota’s analysis offers a comprehensive image with regard to the 
diverse set of roles of central banks around money. The essence of that view is that central banks 
should ensure in practice that the record-keeping functionality supplied by money is performed in 
the most efficient way. 
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The reason for the interest of this perspective of money for the purposes of this paper is twofold. 
Firstly, it fundamentally justifies the broad spectra of roles actually played by central banks in most 
financial systems. Ensuring efficient record-keeping functionality implies de facto a mandate to 
safeguard prices stability, because otherwise inflation might distort the summary of 
past-transactions defining the essence of money and, more importantly, damage the trust on its 
record-keeping capacity for the future. In other words, the value measuring yardstick should be 
itself as free of distortions as possible, something that incidentally has been positively assessed 
under metallic regimes. However, the very desire of guaranteeing that money exhibits efficient 
record-keeping ability automatically leads to broaden central bank’s natural boundary of interest to 
microeconomic aspects of the financial intermediaries involved in the supply of inside money2. The 
involvement of central banks in clearing and settlement issues can also conceptually be understood 
as provision of “database” update services  as new transactions take place in the economy. 
Secondly, the view of central bank activity revolving around a record-keeping technology is also 
alluring because it somewhat sets a theoretical background on the otherwise obvious observations 
that central banks require assets to operate and that its operations entail the management of its 
balance sheet. To be more precise on the latter point raised, notice firstly that setting in circulation 
the mnemonic device that notes and current account holdings are understood to represent, does not 
constitute the only ultimate role of a central bank.  If that were the case, off-balance sheet entries 
would suffice a central bank to accomplish its task of “database manager” of summary records of 
past transactions in the economy. In other words, a central bank would not require a balance sheet 
as we know it, i.e. one where money entries are recorded in the liability side (on-balance) of the 
“database manager”. 
However, the acceptance of fiat money as a valuable item in the economy, together with the need to 
control its outstanding stock, so that a certain concept of price stability is safeguarded, radically 
modifies the last conclusion.  Central banks must exhibit certain (valuable) goods or assets that can 
be used in exchange of (valuable) money, if some draining action is needed in order to safeguard 
some policy objective as price stability. Thus a central bank cannot be expected to operate on the 
vacuum, but needs assets. 
In a classical paper, Cagan (1958) analyzed the reasons for the prevalence of money and bonds as 
the means used by central banks to control activity and prices.  The question arose in a theoretical 
and empirical context that questioned the classical transaction-based rationale underpinning the 
belief in the ability to command the economy by means of money supply control. In a general 
hypothetical setting with open market operations based on arbitrary commodities, Cagan concluded 
that, even if the transaction theory of money exhibits weak validity, that fact does not undermine a 
role for money in stabilization policies. His arguments, based in the special characteristics of the 
supply and demand for money, are still valid to understand the balance sheet of an efficient central 
bank.
From a money supply perspective, Cagan argued that open market operations based on fiduciary 
money guarantee net aggregate real effects (albeit possibly temporary ones), unlike what happens 
with any form of commodity money. The reason lies in the government’s monopoly on fiat money 
and consequently on the absence of substitution effects as a result of its interventions. From a 
money demand perspective, the key aspect favouring money as control instrument in open market 
operations has to do with the speed of adjustments triggered by excess of cash holdings, as 
compared with holdings of other assets.  The basic determinants for that high speed are its broad use 
as exchange media and widespread distribution throughout the economy. As it will be discussed 
                                                     
2 Under a fiat monetary system, checking accounts with banks can be drawn by their owners and converted into banknotes at a one-to-one 
parity, leading to the so called inside money. Goodhart (1991) convincingly makes the case that monetary policy issues supported quite 
early in history a regulatory role over financial intermediaries which provide inside money. 
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later on, this same reason argues in favour of bonds as the second ideal “commodity” entering the 
monetary control tool-kit and, as consequence, supports a key role for government bonds in the 
asset side of a central bank. In other words, in the purest theoretical framework no analogue of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies to a central bank balance sheet. However, to the extent that 
monetary policy operates by affecting financing conditions in the margin this conclusion is not 
binding in practice. 
It should be cautioned that the need for a central bank of having earmarked assets may arise for 
deeper reasons than purely the monetary policy control ones just mentioned. The need of proper 
assets in the asset side of the central bank would be reinforced if confidence on the widespread use 
of fiat money can just be built on the basis of it being backed by something valuable or trusted. 
However, it must be admitted that trust can be based on the most diverse set of psychological 
foundations. Consequently this perspective does not precisely define how the asset side of a central 
bank should look like. 
Surprise as to what the sources of trust in fiat money can be becomes most striking in situations of 
overall crisis. A well known historical example epitomizes this argument. In 1923 Germany 
experienced an extreme hyperinflation period that, incidentally, has been decisive for future 
monetary arrangements in Europe. Sargent (1982) and others have documented how over-issuance 
in a profound social and economic crisis context diminished the real value of the German currency 
to risible levels. The curiosity in the recovery of trust and exit from the monetary mess lies in the 
nature of the backing of the new currency (Rentenmark) launched in the fall of 1923 to stabilize the 
German monetary system. Due to the lack of gold, Rentenmarks were backed by a generic mortgage 
on the land, factories and mines of Germany. The backing was somewhat a fiction, since factories 
and land couldn't be turned into cash or used abroad.  But Germans wanted desperately to believe in 
the Rentenmark, and so it succeeded. The central bank contributed to keep alive that confidence. 
However, its real contribution in that regard was not so much its effort to amass dubious titles on 
the German economy, but a commitment not to devalue the new mark by graciously financing the 
government. 
No matter how the need of earmarked assets arises, the relevant conclusion from the foregoing 
theoretical discussion is the fact that the central bank “toolkit” is its own balance sheet and that, 
optimally, it should be based on bonds on the asset side and on money in the liability side. Profit 
generation or seignorage3 thus pertains to the intrinsic nature of central banks, because (monetary) 
income is necessarily derived from the monopolistic rights over currency in circulation.  However, 
as it will be discussed in section 4, various sources of central bank’s financial vulnerability also 
exist. Their nature can be of two broad types. First, they can consist of events leading to a complete 
erosion of the central bank’s earnings generation capacity. A widespread success of e-money4 is an 
example of a technology development impinging on central banks’ financial strength from an 
earnings generation perspective. Or, second, vulnerability may arise from events leading to wipe out 
any past profits accumulated in the central bank balance sheet. 
                                                     
3 A stock and a flow concept of seignorage exist. The latter reflects grossly speaking the rents on central bank assets whereas the former 
is based on the present value of current and future monetary income [see Repullo (1991)]. 
4 A BIS report (1996) devoted to e-money defines it “as monetary value measured in currency units stored in electronic form on an
electronic device in the consumer's possession. This electronic value can be purchased by the consumer and held on the device and is 
reduced whenever the consumer uses the device to make purchases. This contrasts with traditional electronic payment transactions such 
as those with debit or credit cards which typically require online authorisation and involve the debiting of the consumer's bank account 
after the transaction. There are two different types of electronic devices: prepaid cards and prepaid software products. With prepaid cards, 
the electronic value is stored on a computer chip (or integrated circuit) embedded in the card and value is typically transferred by 
inserting the card in a card reader. With software products, the electronic value is stored on the hard disk of a computer and is transferred 
over communication networks such as the Internet when payments are made”. 
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2.2. Central bank politics-driven ductility and financial independence 
The characterization of central banks as specialized record-keepers illuminates vividly the origin of 
the bias towards inflation existing under fiat monetary regimes: whereas the marginal cost of money 
creation is almost inexistent, its capacity to influence allocations in the economy is enormous. 
Bernholz (2003) documents the marked inflationary bias since the start of the discretionary paper 
money era at the end of the 30s. Generally speaking, the bias has arisen out of the absence of 
self-discipline on central banks side not to yield to demands of economic agents that can be 
accommodated at cero cost in the short term. 
Inflation has thus been a persistent phenomenon until the first 90s due to its apparent ability to 
accommodate the effects of different shocks, policies or bargaining attitudes. Nowadays, the 
consensus has been reached that this accommodating capacity entails significant costs. Moreover, it 
is broadly agreed that a key determinant of the central banks ductility, that made possible the 
inflationary bias, lies in the political and institutional system surrounding them. The short term 
responsiveness of economic activity to expansionary policies has traditionally made of central 
banks a strategic institution to influence. In such context, central bank independence emerged in the 
90s as an institutional mechanism that managed to de-link monetary policy making from 
government influence. 
The institutional set-up for central bank independence typically envisages special provisions as 
regards government borrowing from the central bank. The magnitude of the economic stimulus seek 
by incumbent governments is frequently based first on expansionary fiscal policies that lead to 
budget deficits. The difficulty to finance these deficits depends on the ability and incentives to tap 
financial markets. But even if markets exist, funding from central bank “magic” capabilities has 
typically been an easier and cheaper alternative, if the monetary institution behaved subserviently to 
government wishes. Cottarelli (1993) systematically tracks down the reasons why governments 
have a natural preference to borrow from central banks. 
It is well known that the counterpart of the seemingly free-lunch provided by money financing is 
pressure to higher levels of inflation. Eventually, the scope of the mishandling may exhibit such size 
that real money balances demand starts to fall: agents in the economy anticipate hyperinflationary 
developments and try to avoid their negative effects by shifting to other types of money or even to 
barter. Bernholz (2003) documents that every hyperinflation in history took place under a fiat 
money regime. As a matter of fact, catastrophic distrust to one’s money has always emerged as a 
result of central banks balance sheet manipulation by governments. 
The academic literature did not paid much attention to these practical risks for some time. Money 
has been viewed from a fiscal dimension even under a monetarist tradition, as the classic result by 
Phelps on the optimal level seignorage taxation shows. Namely, Phelps (1973) argued that the 
marginal social costs of inflationary taxation of real money balances should not differ of those 
imposed by other tax instruments. As an immediate implication of this idea, inflation rate targeted 
by the central bank should reflect the overall efficiency of the taxation system. Obviously, this 
solution takes for granted that a subservient central bank is in place.  In contrast, modern monetary 
policy-making literature has established that the benefits of seignorage income are insignificant 
compared to the risks posed by an institutional framework that too easily allows the development of 
deviations from nominal stability goals. Section 3.1 will briefly summarize the special measures 
that limit governments’ recourse to central bank funding under the independency paradigm. 
In addition, the consensus has over time been reached that independent central banks should act as 
fiscal discipline makers. The overall context for an active role of central banks at influencing fiscal 
policy was paved by Sargent and Wallace (1981). In a path-breaking contribution, they managed to 
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give a new sense to the non-separability of monetary and fiscal policies in a fiat money regime. 
They argued that although it may be appropriate to think of monetary and fiscal policy actions as 
separate ventures, it is important to understand their interactions.  They figured out an economy 
where financing the deficit with bonds could ultimately be more inflationary in the long term than 
financing it by printing money. The emergence of such a long term-short term inflation trade-off 
depends on conditions, some of which have been criticized as exotic. However, one of the realistic 
conditions (central bank dependency) was not removed from the landscape until the first 90s. 
Another important output from the posterior research strand rooted in Sargent and Wallace’s 
concerns is the conclusion that the benefits of central-bank independence might finally not bring its 
fruits, if absence of fiscal discipline leads to some non-Ricardian regime that makes unfeasible in 
practice the achievement of central-bank goals. 
Combating such negative fiscal outcomes has thus become a cornerstone of central bank activity. 
However, central banks’ only available tool in such endeavour is just persuasion. On the other hand, 
it is well known that virtue is a prerequisite for effective preaching. From this perspective, both the 
value of credibility to defend fiscal prudence and interest in preserving their own freedom lead 
independent central banks to wish for themselves the fulfilment of some minimum financial 
strength requirements. The core of the argument is the idea that effectiveness in central bank actions 
and messages rely intensively on its reputational capital. Criticisms to government fiscal profligacy 
stemming from the central bank might be easily countered or played down if central bank 
performance was itself deficient or, if being that the case, an adequate explanation for the fact was 
absent.  An extreme situation of that problematic could arise if the central bank had to seek fresh 
resources from the government to bring its books back to balance. Thus, even under a formally 
independent central bank regime decisions could be somewhat influenced if financial performance 
is improper. 
Central bank financial vulnerability can create channels for such outcomes to arise. Notice that 
financial vulnerability is understood to be something not unlike the financial distress situations 
capturing the attention of the corporate literature, in that the erosion of central bank financial 
strength might lead to significant costs. In the central banking case, the costs are those due to the 
real effects ensuing from the lost of reputational capital, i.e. ultimately inflationary bias. 
The solution to the central banks financial strength problem is twofold. Firstly, central banks must 
be endowed with sufficient capital, so that they can stand on their own after the realization of some 
worst-case scenarios on its vulnerable profile. Secondly, central banks need to establish an adequate 
transparency and accountability regime on financial matters so that financial weakness can be 
understood by economic agents. 
In summary, goal or instrument central bank independence statues could be voided or seriously 
impaired in practice by two types of financial mechanisms. Firstly, the central bank balance sheet 
might be materially outside its own control capacity if exogenous undesired draws on its base 
money production capacity are possible so as accommodate external draw downs5. Secondly,  an 
otherwise legal independent central bank may see its functional freedom of choice impaired if a 
poor financial performance compels the monetary authority to somewhat having to yield to 
government’s goals, if the latter holds the key for the provision of new resources to continue central 
bank operations, or, if the poor performance itself damages central bank credibility. The immediate 
steps to discuss these issues are as follows. Section 3.1 summarizes some of the widespread 
measures in pace aimed at limiting government recourse to central bank funds.  Section 3.2 
                                                     
5 Obviously, strictly speaking exchange rate pegs are outside this characterization of lack of independence. However,  a central bank 
genuinely pursuing nominal stabilization goals and pegging its exchange rate so as to import credibility may be considered as a central 
bank somewhat importing a necessary ingredient to later achieve full-fledged independence. 
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advances some the arguments strictly pertaining to the central bank financial strength problematic. 
Its detailed discussion will fill the rest of the paper. 
3. Financial-driven Threats To Central Bank Independence
3.1. Government recourse to central bank funding 
The historical origin of central banks as bankers to the government has traditionally determined that 
a fiscal agent condition was a natural companion of their monetary policy role. The breadth of fiscal 
agent services may be quite varied and dependent on historical and institutional developments6. As 
a rule, access by central banks to information on liquidity developments driven by payments and 
receipts of public entities has traditionally lead to a positive assessment of combining a fiscal agent 
role and monetary policy execution. However, two risks of this dual role have tended to finally 
dominate the assessment of fiscal agent services provision by central banks. Firstly, an unrestricted 
involvement of central banks as fiscal agents may effectively facilitate monetary budget financing if 
it eases in practice its access to overdrafts. Secondly, even if that is not the case, “leasing” the 
central bank balance sheet to supply fiscal agent services may be the cause of distortions to base 
money control that ultimately may outweigh the informational advantage gained7.
Such considerations, along with instrument independence ones, have led to the outcome that central 
bank independence laws normally set stiff restrictions on central bank advances to governments. 
Legal inflexibility on this dimension is agreed to be a basic condition to put at good use the 
off-budget nature of central banks. However, it is important to notice that such prohibitions and 
statutory requirements do not exclude government debt from central banks’ asset composition. To 
the contrary, such limits must be compatible with the benefits derived from the optimal properties 
of government debt as asset covering a significant chunk of central banks’ liabilities. 
The imposition of strong limits to governmental recourse to central bank funding has traditionally 
been perceived as a milestone in the evolution of central banks towards independence standards. In 
the US, Federal Reserve-Treasury relations evolved to keep monetary policy and debt management 
separate. After the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, the Federal Reserve was freed from 
the obligation to support government bond prices in the secondary market. Currently, the Federal 
Reserve makes all additions to its portfolio through purchases of securities outstanding8. However, 
in a refunding the manager of the SOMA portfolio can directly subscribe bonds, although by an 
amount that not exceeds the one of the maturing securities it holds. The Bank of Japan also faces a 
prohibition to underwrite government bonds and to make loans to the government.  However, 
subject to limits and transparency requirements also some exceptions to that rule are contemplated, 
e.g. when the newly issued bonds are intended to refund maturing bonds included in the portfolio 
held by the central bank for monetary policy reasons.  In the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), Article 101 of the EU Treaty prohibits overdrafts or any other type of credit facility as well 
as direct purchases of public debt instruments by the ECB or by national central banks. However, 
                                                     
6 The fiscal agent function may comprise functions like making and receiving payments for public entities involving accounts at the 
central bank, bringing coins into circulation for Government, servicing public title on behalf and for the account of the public issuer, 
issuing and redeeming debt instruments for public debtors and maybe at the same time advising public entities on the characteristics and 
conditions of debt instruments to promote their placement in the markets, advancing funds for public expenditure in relation to
international operations or institutions, granting advances to public entities enabling them to bridge temporary need for funds, holding 
public entities cash etc. 
7 The issue at stake is instrument independence. Obviously, this independence concept depends heavily on the operational scheme in
place. This explains the diversity of arrangements that traditionally has existed across central banks as regards the provision of Treasury 
services. In the ESCB, the practice of offering such services “through” the central banks balance sheets has been established, 
i.e. minimizing distortions of the central banks balance sheet. 
8 The main Fed portfolio is the one corresponding to the system of open market account (SOMA). 
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the acquisition by national central banks or by the ECB of public sector debt instruments in the 
secondary market is not prohibited by the Treaty, although such purchases must not be used to 
circumvent the objective of Article 101 of the Treaty. 
The common principle underlying all those restrictions is twofold. Firstly, they intend to grant 
central banks full autonomy on their decisions on assets portfolio and, therefore, the ability to 
control base money as well as the appearance thereof. Secondly, the limits have generally speaking 
been formulated so that one of the basic and historical roles of central banks is not undermined, 
i.e. its capacity to elastically provide currency. 
However, central bank independence statutes seldom have taken so far into consideration how to 
deal with the special type of overdraft situations that motivates the subject of this paper, i.e. central 
bank accumulated losses9. Accumulated losses may deplete central bank capital. In this regard, it is 
important to notice that, should profits obtained in good years not be available to repair damages to 
central banks’ financial strength in bad ones, amounts in economic terms to granting a zero rate 
indefinite term loan to the government. 
3.2. Central bank inadequate financial position 
A frequently decisive financial link between governments and central banks regards the shareholder 
condition that the former normally exhibits in the latter. Although some central banks still have 
private shareholders to some extent10, public ownership is however the standard in accordance with 
the nature of their economic function. Governments are thus entitled to transfers of dividends out of 
the profits earned by the monetary authority. This paper deals with the interplay between such use 
and the alternative one of safeguarding central bank financial independence. 
Central banking has historically evolved towards negation of profit seeking as a valid objective. 
This is especially a true statement in the era of independent central banks. However, disregard of 
profits does not necessarily imply some sort of natural endurance of financial losses, because central 
banks financial distress is perceived not to be in accordance with normal economics11. It is this 
divergence with normal outcomes that ultimately makes possible perverse interactions between 
monetary policy making and (bad) central bank financial performance. 
An otherwise legal and instrument independent central bank might see its effective freedom of 
choice impaired if approval of its annual budget or some lack of material resources would compel 
the monetary authority to somewhat having to yield to government’s goals or suggestions12.  As a 
matter of fact, even if no capital injection providing new resources is needed, poor financial 
performance may still be the source of undesired pressures on decision-making by central bankers. 
Pressure might be explicit or implicit. A form of implicit distortion on free decision making might 
be self-restraint on the central bankers side on the adoption of monetary policy measures that 
eventually could drive it to a situation of financial distress. Two sorts of issues arise in connection 
                                                     
9A recent survey of central bank accounting practices shows that 42% of the respondents had no legal provisions for the recapitalization 
of the central bank, should it become necessary [see Kurtzig and Mander (2003)]. 
10 Examples of followers of such historical tradition are the Federal Reserve System, the National Bank of Belgium, the Bank of Italy, the 
Bank of Greece or the Swiss National Bank. Remarkably, shares of the last three central banks are listed either in bearer or registered
form. In the Federal Reserve System, law requires that all nationally chartered commercial banks and saving and loans institutions buy 
stock in their regional Federal Reserve Bank proportionally to their respective sizes. Bank of Italy shares were originally held by public 
commercial banks.  Their privatization has thus altered their initially indirect public charter. 
11 However, Goodhart (2000) argues that in a free banking regime central banks should be willing to bear losses to still be able to control 
monetary base. Anyway, if they would show such willingness monetary policy would still be possible. 
12 In some cases of central banks being also held privately, corporate disputes have occasionally arisen around economic rights. Although 
Statutes normally leave no margin to private shareholders in material central bank business, it may be arguable the need to maintain an 
exposure to commercial disputes just because of shareholding legacy reasons. However, for this paper they are just anecdotes. 
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with this generic problem. Firstly, how can dearth of resources for a seemingly almighty central 
bank come about? Secondly, what is the optimal institutional and procedural way to handle 
situations of distress? 
Responding to both questions calls for going beyond a robot-like portrait of central bank behaviour 
and consider basic microeconomic aspects of central bank structure. Section 4 will work out how in 
theory the mandate and balance sheet structure of a central bank determine its earnings generation 
capacity as well as its on –and off– balance exposure to financial risks. Central banks earnings 
capacity is quite often most seriously impaired by the materialization of extraordinary exposure to 
risks. Financial stability concerns typically define either implicit or explicit funding commitments 
for central banks with markets and/or institutions. Thus, losses stemming from banking rescue 
operations accounted for in central banks books may end up being an insurmountable drag for 
central bank independence if remedy measures are not undertaken in advance. In the same vein, 
development banking mandates for central banks in emerging markets can similarly undermine their 
effective autonomy. 
In normal times, the type of backing for the monetary base in circulation inevitably leads also to 
risk exposure. Similarly to its effect on private decision makers, earnings volatility may ex-ante or 
ex-post condition central bankers’ behaviour; particularly if it might be conductive to losses. Under 
market value based accounting, an important volatility source is the straightforward effect of assets 
prices and exchange rate movements imparting directly on the income statement, i.e. the effect of 
unrealized gains and losses. Excessive volatility in central banks’ financial statements may 
simultaneously be problematic and somewhat avoided. As regards its potential to promote situations 
of distress, one should notice that an excess of volatility of profits increases the risk, already pointed 
out before, that too many dividends might be distributed in good years, whereas no call back 
mechanism on them is available when losses arrive. 
This argument is reinforced by the fact that the recourse to hedging tools enabling large scale 
damping down of earnings volatility is severely limited in the central bank world, if their use may 
exert a distorting influence on monetary policy signalling. Therefore, a key mechanism to safeguard 
central banks financial health is the existence and recognition of mechanisms that autonomously 
dampen volatility. The existence of well defined cycles of earnings generation normally justifies 
moving from volatile full fair value accounting schemes to smoother alternatives. In this regard, two 
important central banks’ earnings generation cycles will be identified in section 4, which inspire the 
main results of this paper. However, for expositional reasons a full fair value accounting framework 
will be assumed throughout most of the paper. In the event, its unconstrained validity will 
nevertheless be negated, as hinted by the reference before to the existence of natural earnings 
generation cycles. 
Section 5 and 6 will elaborate on financial arrangements to safeguard central bank financial 
independence to the light of apparent (i.e. accounting driven) and real financial threats. Previously, 
the conceptual issues that arise in an exercise of central bank risk budgeting will be systematically 
covered in section 4. The actual budgeting exercise is out of the scope of this paper. Section 5 deals 
specifically with the short-term capital requirement for central banks consistent with their risk 
exposure. Section 6 deals with the interplay between accounting, profit distribution and central bank 
capitalization so that the rights of the shareholders over dividends, the financial strength of the 
central bank and overall transparency of the setup can be consistent goals. 
Interestingly, the solution to the financial strength problem must bear also in mind the fact that 
excessive central bank capital may end up being the cause for some central bank unrest too. In a 
seminal article Jensen (1986) highlighted the risks of an excess of free cash flows in a corporate 
context. The argument can arguably be extended also to a central bank context. In effect, central 
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bank autonomy strengthens the scope for such risks to actually materialize. The controversy around 
an allegedly excessive capitalization that actually broke out in Switzerland, between the Swiss 
Social-democratic Party and the Swiss National Bank, is a good case to illustrate the practical 
relevance of this argument13.
4. Central Bank Functions, Earnings Sources and Financial Vulnerability
This section intends to highlight the major considerations determining the earnings generation 
capacity and exposure to financial risks of a generic central bank. The goal is to outline the 
interplay between central banks functions and the overall shape of their financial statements. Some 
of the policy or structural factors have already been pointed out in previous section. However, a 
more systematic discussion is warranted in order to assist budgetary and accountability 
perspectives. 
Before going into the details, it is important to emphasize the overall approach to deal with the 
problem. The conceptual elements of a risk budgeting exercise for central banks will be delineated. 
With that view in mind, a discussion is made on the implications in terms of asset-liability 
management from the different functions of a generic central bank. It is acknowledged in advance 
that central banks balance sheets are in practice not easily amenable to a straightforward matching 
of assets and liabilities. However, even if the actual mechanisms leading to the makeup of central 
banks balance sheet in terms of assets and liabilities can not be simply reduced to segregated 
components along neat functional dimensions, the conclusions attained on central bank overall 
risk-return profile will be still valid. 
An analytical (unmatched) outline of the balance sheet of a generic central bank may be as follows 
Table 1 
Central Bank Balance Sheet 
 Assets Liabilities  
 F  (if) P  (ip) Lc
Ay B (ig) R  (id)
 RF (ir)   
  N  
Aqf L  (il)   
 Q  (iq) RR Lnc
      
Any G K  
 O   
where the comprehensive entries Ay and Any stand for yielding and non-yielding assets, 
respectively, and Aqf represents central bank assets whose financial terms are “out of the market”. 
Similarly, Lc and Lnc stand for costly and non-costly liabilities, respectively. As regards the main 
entries, F, B and RF stand, respectively, for foreign assets, government debt and refinancing 
balances, whereas L and Q designate, respectively, preferential loans to the government and other 
preferential operations. G denotes gold holdings and O other assets. On the liability side, P stands 
for costly liabilities other than reserves (R) maintained by banks in the central banks’ book 
and N stands for banknotes in circulation.  RR and K designate, respectively, the set of provision 
and capital accounts. Next to every balance sheet entry, its corresponding rate of reference is 
                                                     
13 See Ungern-Sternberg (2002). 
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displayed when applicable. Chart 1 shows a stylized version of actual balance sheets scaled to the 
respective sizes of the central banks as of 31st December 2002. 
Chart 1
Foreign
Assets Gold
Govern.
Debt Other1 Refinancing
Other
Fin.
Other
Credit
Australia 61.6 2.0 9.0 0.0 25.3 0.0 2.1
Canada 1.5 0.0 91.8 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.3
Denmark 51.0 1.4 4.7 6.2 35.2 0.0 1.6
Eurosystem 32.0 16.4 5.6 4.0 28.6 0.0 13.3
Iceland 30.6 1.5 1.6 0.0 66.3 0.0 0.1
Japan 3.0 0.3 62.8 20.6 8.6 0.2 4.4
Norway2 26.8 0.3 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 71.2
Spain 33.5 5.7 4.6 10.1 18.9 0.0 27.2
Switzerland 45.9 24.1 5.8 0.0 22.9 0.0 1.3
U.K.3 0.0 0.0 6.8 28.7 50.2 0.0 14.3
U.S. 2.7 1.6 90.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 3.1
1 Includes loans to the government.
2 The Petroleum Fund is included in Other Credit .
3 Consolidated balance sheet of the Issue and Banking Departments.
Banknotes
Financial
Institutions Govern. Other Securities Other1 Capital
Australia 48.3 0.9 20.7 0.5 0.0 12.0 17.5
Canada 93.6 2.7 1.2 0.9 0.0 1.5 0.1
Denmark 12.7 15.1 13.4 1.4 42.8 1.4 13.2
Eurosystem 46.8 16.8 5.8 1.1 0.3 10.8 18.5
Iceland 8.2 20.9 19.4 0.0 0.0 17.0 34.5
Japan 50.3 22.7 22.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.1
Norway2 5.2 6.7 6.3 0.0 6.6 72.2 3.0
Spain 38.9 9.6 15.8 0.0 0.0 22.2 13.5
Switzerland 28.2 3.2 5.0 0.5 0.0 13.5 49.6
U.K.3 66.9 5.1 2.6 10.1 0.0 12.4 3.0
U.S. 92.2 3.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 1.6 2.4
1 Includes foreign denominated debt.
2 The Petroleum Fund Balances distorts the real capitalization of the central bank.
3 Other deposits includes those maintained by other central banks. Other liabilities includes the balance of foreign isssues.
Deposits
Outright Holdings Financial Institutions
Stylized Central Bank Assets
 (as % of total assets, year end 2002)
Stylized Central Bank Liabilities
(as % of total liabilities, year end 2002)
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Central bank earnings accounts contain entries that reflect the interaction between central bank 
balances and relevant interest rates as well as records that reflect revaluation adjustments, fees and 
expenses.
Table 2 
Central Bank P & L 
Income Expenses 
Id Interest income, 
domestic portfolio 
Interest expenses. Ie
If Interest income, 
foreign assets 
Operative expenses,
notes and coinage. 
En
Rvd Revaluation adjustment,
domestic portfolio 
Operative expenses,
services provided. 
Es
Rvf Recognized adjustment,
foreign portfolio 
Administration 
expenses. 
Ea
Is Income from services 
provided 
Provision charges. Chp
Ro Other revaluation  
adjustments 
Reserve charges. Chr
Io Other income Profit/Loss ?
It is important to emphasize that accounting principles are not for the time being a subject of 
concern. As advanced at the end of previous section, a market value approach will be used as 
benchmark throughout the discussion. However, sections 5 and 6 will exploit the conclusions 
gained in this setting to elaborate on the role of accounting for central bank financial independence 
matters.
The overall appearance of central bank financial statements is mainly shaped by three fundamental 
set of factors. Firstly, the confluence of the different policies implemented by central banks 
decisively determines the aspect of their balance sheet and earning accounts. Secondly, the 
strategies and instrumental procedures chosen for policy implementation purposes also definitively 
delimit central banks financial profile. Thirdly, contextual restrictions in various forms such as 
degree of development of local financial markets, the level of government debt outstanding or law 
practices also shape the structure of central banks financial statements. 
Laymen usually assume that central bank’s business is exclusively monetary policy making. 
Although normative positions justifying the correctness of such an assumption may exist, the fact is 
that central banks may also implement financial stability and credit policies.  Financial stability 
aimed actions have acquired of late a dimension that goes beyond a rule-making or prudence 
encouragement role, to potentially also entail the deployment of financial resources to assist 
markets or institutions in trouble. Reputational and financial risks may also arise in connection with 
credit policies pursued by central banks. In line with this functional dissection, section 4.1 will 
cover the earnings and risk budgeting issues arising in connection with the exercise of the monetary 
and exchange rate policy. Section 4.2 and section 4.3 will deal with the same problematic with 
regard to credit and financial stability policies, respectively. Section 4.4 will cover the risk-return 
issues arising in connection with financial statement entries that deserve some separate treatment 
like gold holdings, intra-system accounts or entries related to services provision. 
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4.1. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
Monetary and exchange rate policies are respectively concerned with the internal and external value 
of domestic money.  It is well known that in a world free of restrictions to capital and trade flows 
independent goals for both policies are naturally inconsistent. Therefore, monetary constitutions 
must ascribe a pre-eminent role to one of the policies, keeping a subordinated one for the other. 
From a central bank financial independence perspective, these very general remarks are important 
because the actual choice made in that regard determines a fundamental aspect of central banks risk 
profile. In general, pursuance of some type of external value objectives for money implies the need 
to maintain substantial precautionary holdings of foreign assets and, therefore, to take on significant 
exchange rate risk. Thus, from the standpoint adopted in this paper, the relevant dividing feature 
between monetary and exchange rate policies are the risk-return profiles of the portfolios by whose 
means they are materialized, i.e. domestic portfolio and reserve assets. 
4.1.1. Domestic portfolio 
There is substantial disagreement among economists concerning the nature and magnitude of 
influence of monetary policy on the price level and real activity in the short term, but this does not 
obscure the broad agreement on the central role of purchases and sales of government securities by 
central banks (i.e. open market operations) as the most effective instrumental procedure to set the 
monetary tone, possibly with the assistance of standing facilities. Also, a general agreement exists 
in that there is an important unique role for the public sector in the management of banknote 
issuance. In particular, a widely held view among economists is that the supply of the ultimate 
media of exchange is an activity that should not be left to the private sector. For example, Milton 
Friedman (1960) argues that the provision of money is fraught with market failures and that the 
government should have a monopoly in the supply and control of the stock of circulating currency. 
The efficient execution of those classical functions of a monetary authority is typically understood 
to involve maintaining holdings of government debt on the central bank’s balance sheet, even 
though many other assets may serve also as cover. However, we will see that the contribution to a 
central banks risk-return profile of balances held to back notes in circulation and the one of holdings 
underlying open market operations may be quite different. Some central banks even exhibit 
segregated accounting units in charge of note issuance and of banking business, respectively. The 
Bank of England is a classical example of a central bank with such a dual setup. 
4.1.1.1. Banknote issuance 
As regards the backing of currency issued, a good starting point is a reminder of the historical 
origins of central banking. Goodhart (1991) documents how banks of the government gradually 
came to naturally concentrate the monetary and regulatory functions which are now understood to 
belong to central banks. The “natural” forces operating in that process of selection among entities 
operating under free banking regimes were basically two: the overall confidence of customers in the 
assistance of the government to his own bank if a panic situation would arise14 and the economies of 
scale achieved with banknotes issued backed by the most abundant homogeneous liabilities in the 
economy, i.e. by government debt15.
                                                     
14 However some banks bankrupted due to the default of the government. 
15 In this regard, a historical reminder illustrates the complementary relationship between government debt and currency. The distinct
feature of the Bank of England as private bank back in the seventeenth century that led to an outstanding position in the note issuing 
activity was the fact that, instead of discounting bills as other private banks did, banknotes issued by the Bank of England were used to 
buy government debt.  The Bank of England exploited thus the liquidity-enhancing network externality created by the widespread 
circulation of its notes. See Quinn and Roberds (2003). 
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For our purposes now, the relevant conclusion from that evolution is that currency is naturally 
backed by government debt. It is far from true that such an outcome is free from trade-offs. 
Williamson (2002) discusses from a classical perspective the compromises implicit in the choice of 
public versus private media of exchange. His analysis opposes the economic efficiency achieved 
with private money (because of its backing with productive investment) and the alleged sterility of 
government debt backed fiat money. On the other side of the balance, one must obviously consider 
the cost of having private money in circulation that could be counterfeited more easily than fiat 
money and the implications of this possibility in terms of social welfare. 
In the market value accounting basis considered thus far, central bank earnings associated with 
money issuance have two neat economic components: i.e. interest payments, either from 
government debt or from any other asset holdings backing notes, and capital gains and losses on 
those holdings. In practice, accounting definitions of monetary income exclusively focus on the 
stable component of earnings16. Monetary income thus measures central bank medium term 
profitability. However, from a central bank financial independence perspective the relevant metrics 
are total earnings. Incidentally, it is also important to notice that central banks can not easily counter 
earnings volatility with hedging instruments, given the signalling effects that its recourse could 
unleash. Namely, hedging actions aimed at smoothing the financial impact of outright government 
bond exposures backing currency in circulation could distort both the signals and transmission of 
ordinary monetary policy tools based in the control of short interest rates. 
From the discussion so far, it might look as if the domestic debt backing portfolio were intrinsically 
volatile. However, a proper view of the central bank risk-return trade-off associated with the 
currency-backing portfolio can just be gained by considering the life cycle of notes issued. With 
that purpose in mind, let us see the mechanism followed to place currency in circulation. Notice that 
its continuous working leads to the automatic genesis of a big part of a central bank’s balance sheet. 
Banknotes are issued at commercial banks initiative. When banks need currency, they draw on their 
current accounts at the central bank, i.e. newly issued notes are paid for with the reserves they held 
in the central bank. Thus, issuance of notes initially results in the swapping of one liability 
(reserves) for another (banknotes), with no impact on the central bank’s income statement at that 
very precise moment.  Afterwards, the recurrent impact on the income statement arises from the 
combined effect of the permanent base money needs faced by commercial banks, due to the 
banknotes issued, together with the profile of the refinancing instruments offered by the central 
bank to accommodate those needs. Namely, as will shortly be described, central banks typically 
provide current account reserves in exchange for liquid securities, such as government bonds 
delivered outright or through repo operations. In other words, although banknotes issued are 
initially paid for with deposit reserves, ultimately they are paid with government debt or with other 
eligible asset17. Having in mind the mechanism leading to the emergence of banknotes’ cover, let us 
resume our initial goal dealing with the life cycle of notes and its impact on the return-risk profile of 
central banks’ banknote issuance business. 
Leaving aside deterioration-driven replacement of currency, the expected life of net additions to 
banknotes outstanding typically has no defined term to maturity. In many countries banknotes 
outstanding follow a secular growth process in nominal terms that relegates the redemption horizon 
                                                     
16 More precisely, monetary income is defined as income from assets backing monetary policy. In accordance with this general definition, 
monetary income encompasses not just interest on assets backing notes but also interest of assets backing banks’ reserves at the monetary 
authority. However, as will be argued later on, the last component is frequently quite small if reserves are remunerated.   
17 In markets where government debt outstanding is insufficient, collateralized credit to banks has traditionally been a substitute.
Section 4.1.1.2, dealing with monetary policy control, will elaborate further on the risk-return trade-offs arising from alternatives 
different to outright government debt holdings and on collateral issues. 
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for new currency issued very far in the future (see Chart 2). Certainly, it can not be discarded either 
that banknotes outstanding could shrink at any time. These features leave ample margin to the 
central bank asset managers as regards investment decisions on the maturity profile of assets 
covering banknotes. A buffer of temporary operations that match potential currency redemptions 
and outright holdings covering the whole maturity spectrum could be combined rather arbitrarily to 
cover currency outstanding18. In other words, central bank interest rate exposure could be expected 
to rather unrestrictedly cover the whole yield curve spectrum. 
However, in practice assets covering banknotes are not entirely dedicated ones, so that the 
performance of other central banks’ functions set additional constrains to the portfolio problem. 
Namely, preferences on the liquidity and maturity of the government debt portfolio also depend on 
the requirements set by the delivery of the financial stability function. As an example of this fact, it 
is noticeable that, in the US, preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee for the liquidity of 
SOMA portfolio sharply increased in the aftermath of the Continental Illinois crisis since a massive 
volume of loans provided through the discount window had to be somehow offset19.  In other words, 
reasons other than currency backing ones normally bias central banks’ portfolio to shorter duration 
ones.
So far no restrictions have been derived as regards the degree of activism in the management of the 
outright portfolio backing banknotes. However, in many countries most securities owned by the 
central bank as a backstop to base money are held to maturity20. For example, in the SOMA 
portfolio debt holdings are maintained across the entire yield curve according to per issue guideline 
limits. This policy ensures neutrality of central bank balance sheet management actions as regards 
                                                     
18 Sometimes even long cycles of banknote demand are accommodated with temporary operations covering time intervals much longer 
(i.e. three months) than those of temporary operation for monetary policy purposes. 
19 See Federal Reserve Bulletin (1997). 
20 Canada, Japan , New Zealand and the US count among them. 
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their impact on the working of affected markets. Elsewhere, major policy objectives for domestic 
portfolios are normally instrumented in terms of benchmarked mandates to line managers, with the 
additional goal of enhancing the return over the one that would have been achieved with a pure buy 
and hold strategy. 
The risk-return implications of following a buy-and-hold strategy or a benchmarked one for the 
portfolio covering banknotes outstanding can be quite different. The first choice defines a cycle of 
central banks’ earnings that minimizes the significance of market value accounting for central bank 
medium term profitability measurement. Its outstanding feature is the fact that principal is 
recovered at maturity under any market developments.  In other words, no matter if bond prices go 
up and down over a short term horizon the yield to maturity at trade date sets an expected 
component for total return. A benchmarking strategy cannot offer such guarantee. As a counterpart 
to the return add-on, some risk must be incurred, i.e. risk-budgeting techniques must be deployed to 
account its contribution to the return-risk pair. These remarks turn out to be important for some 
aspects of central bank financial strength. As we will discuss in sections 5 and 6, a market value 
accounting basis causes artificial appearance of central bank vulnerability if applied to a 
buy-and-hold portfolio. The issue is more complex for the case of a benchmarked strategy21.
In previous paragraphs, the risk-return analysis related to unitary exposure, i.e. the outstanding 
amount of banknotes was considered to be fixed. However, total earnings from banknote issuance 
are unitary earnings scaled by the amount of notes in circulation. No matter how obvious this 
statement may be, it nevertheless significantly widens the profile of central bank independency 
issues. The underlying economic ground for this additional source of complexity is one of the basic 
tenets of central banking. Namely, monetary authorities must be ready to elastically provide notes 
as demanded. In other words, the scale factor determining central bank earnings from banknote 
issuance is as volatile as demand for currency can be. 
Leaving aside seasonal factors, the technological dimension of money discussed in section 2 seems 
to put payment system innovation enabling alternatives to banknotes at the forefront of the set of 
factors moving the scale of currency demand secularly. In the limit, technological developments 
that, theoretically speaking, enable e-money solutions that evade central bank’s monetary income 
generation channels, have led to extreme propositions claiming that central bank revenues might at 
some point no longer be able to cover operational costs.  However, radical conclusions like that one 
fail to consider some basic facts that strongly limit their feasibility. First, they fail to ponder that 
regulatory authorisation of payment system innovation must reach compromises between 
innovation as such and broader policy concerns. Thus, in Europe the EMI Directive (Directive 
2000/46/EC) has been moulded on the basis of a compromise between the free access to the 
e-money activities to non-banks and the position favoured by the European Monetary Institute 
(1994) of restricting that business to credit institutions. The prospect of significant migration of 
banknotes to bank issued e-money has led to various suggestions aimed at safeguarding central 
bank financial independence: imposing non-remunerated reserve requirements on deposits backing 
bank issued e-money, making central banks a competing issuer of e-money or even restricting to 
them the ability to issue e-money22. However, so far e-money has not been a great success so that it 
can be perceived as a challenge for the “shadow base of central bank capital”, as Henckel et al.
(1999) fittingly have named banknotes outstanding. 
                                                     
21 Annex 1 briefly discusses how benchmarking impacts on central banks’ risk-return profile as opposed to buy-and-hold strategies. Its 
content will be recalled in sections 5 and 6 because it has a definitive impact on capital and accounting issues. If the yield curve turns out 
to evolve across time in accordance with its shape at the inception of the benchmarking strategy, the return of that strategy over a horizon 
equal to the duration target equals the return of an investment to maturity.  In the realistic case, anticipation to yield curve movements is 
the source of return add-on and risk. 
22 See Groeneveld and Visser (1997). 
25
There is a second conceptual reason that assigns a limited potential for e-money. Leaving aside 
operational advantages, one of the deepest differences between banknotes and e-money relates to 
their recording capacity. As discussed in section 2.1, the essence of banknotes is their anonymous 
recording ability. In this regard, Goodhart (2000) notes the potentially devastating effects for the 
use of e-money if its capacity to store information on transactions is perceived by users as a threat 
to the anonymity of trades23.
Payment system innovation has thus been somewhat downplayed as a mover of the scale factor for 
currency demand. More important for most central banks are developments related with overseas 
holdings of one’s banknotes. Thus, dollarization or euroization processes in transition countries 
enrich the monetary base of larger central banks at the expense of those of transition countries. Most 
prominent is the US dollar case, where the official estimate for 2001 establishes that 50 percent of 
the $580 billion of US currency in circulation was held abroad. Unstable monetary and political 
regimes have ultimately led to widespread situations of unofficial dollarization that amount in 
financial terms to a transfer of income to a foreign economy. Interestingly, proposals to share 
seignorage with dollarizing countries subject to economic performance conditions have not 
succeeded so far24.
Individual central banks in federal systems are by definition also exposed to banknotes migration 
effects and, as a consequence, their respective financial independence is subject to the vagaries of 
banknotes’ excursions throughout the monetary area. Section 4.4.2 will specifically deal with 
financial independence issues arising in a federal context. 
However, at this point it is relevant to identify two sorts of federal systems. On the one hand, stands 
the class represented by the US Federal Reserve System, where notes are direct claims of the 
issuing Federal Reserve Bank and, therefore, are marked accordingly. The Eurosystem25 would be a 
prototype of the second sort of federal system with regard to banknote issuance: namely, notes are 
totally undifferentiated means of payment. The distinction is relevant in terms of financial 
independence of individual central banks. Whereas under the first modality of federal system the 
decrease of earnings due to banknotes redeemed in a central bank other than the issuing one can be 
passed on to the latter, in the second one the absence of any differentiating mark in the currency 
hinders that central banks’ balance sheet resizing in the aftermath of banknote redemption can be 
governed by information on who in the system was originally the issuer. In turn, such indeterminacy 
brings about the need of clear rules as to how share monetary income between central banks26.
4.1.1.2. Monetary policy control 
In section 2.1, the reference to the arguments by Cagan (1958) on the prevalence of open market 
operations based on money and bonds, was focused on the first element of the couple.  It is now the 
right place to remind the theoretical arguments in favour of bonds as the second component of the 
monetary policy lever. Notice that in doing so, one also implicitly justifies the trend towards the 
presence of government debt among central banks’ assets. 
                                                     
23 Following a similar line of reasoning, Rogoff (1998) has interpreted that the provision of high denomination banknotes is tantamount to 
a supply of a taxation evasion technology. From a different perspective, one could also view them as a means to tax the underground
economy. 
24 Humpage (2002) discusses an incentive-compatible proposal for returning seigniorage to officially dollarizing countries, under which 
the US Treasury would purchase dollar-denominated, zero-coupon bonds at face value from the governments of dollarizing countries that 
undertake sound budgetary practices and that liberalize their financial markets. 
25 The Eurosystem comprises the subgroup of ESCB central banks that have adopted the euro. 
26 In the ESCB, monetary income allocation is ruled by articles 16 and 32 of the ESCB Statute, along with Decisions ECB/2001/15 and
ECB/2001/16. 
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The widespread use of bonds in open market operations and its preferred status over other assets 
can be said to rest firstly on the broader impact achieved by dealing in bonds. Net bond purchases 
by a central bank tend to lower the cost of borrowing funds and stimulate investment. Further to this 
point, government bonds are singled out because they normally act as benchmarks for private 
borrowing price setting. In addition, government bonds also fulfil a precondition that ensures a high 
speed of adjustment to price changes; namely, the widespread distribution of government debt 
holdings among agents typically accelerates responsiveness to actions of control. Obviously, these 
statements about efficient monetary policy tools rest on the precondition of having mature 
government and money markets27. As a matter of fact, it turns out to be a widespread phenomenon 
that central banks tend to be quite involved in the development of government debt market 
infrastructure in early stages28. Notwithstanding such commonalities, some central 
banks (e.g., US Fed) rely more intensively on outright transactions than on repurchase agreements 
(e.g., the Eurosystem) as instrument for open market operations. The different degree of use of 
repurchase agreements may reflect various factors: the different importance in financial markets of 
such operations, a disparate secular rate of growth of the central bank portfolio, existing constraints 
and, possibly, and more important for the purposes of this paper, a dissimilar perception of central 
banks themselves on the need to limit their interest rate risks. 
As an alternative to government debt, market-based monetary policy operations can also be 
implemented with securities issued by the central bank itself. This is a practice mostly followed by 
countries in transition, especially those plagued by problems of excess liquidity due to previous 
policies29. For the purposes of this paper, the interesting feature of such central bank issued 
monetary policy instruments lies in the fact that they may lead to a reduction in central bank profits 
or even to losses if they have to be issued in large amounts. One just needs to notice that their mere 
placement among commercial banks under market conditions entails a costly liability to the central 
bank. It is important to stress that such an outcome can be crucial for the continuity of reforms in 
central banks in transition countries, if their financial performance is assessed in isolation, 
i.e. without reference to the goals of the transition process30.
Leaving aside the described impact of central bank issued securities, monetary policy control based 
on “outside securities”, can be said to be largely neutral for the finances of central banks relying 
more intensively in repurchase operations. The reason for that is the normally tight matching 
pursued between short-term assets and liabilities. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to cover these aspects in detail. Borio (2000), Blenck et al. (2001) 
and Kopcke (2002) survey some of the issues surrounding monetary policy implementation from a 
                                                     
27 The case for bonds in central bank balance sheet is valid no matter if the instrumentation procedure is based in a short-term interest rate 
(see below) or a longer term reference as reminded by Bernanke (2003) in connection with unconventional monetary policy options to 
combat deflation. In the former case, well functioning repo and money markets capable of transmitting monetary impulses to longer 
maturity terms are a key precondition. As money markets develop, repurchase agreements suit the efficient execution of policy in
comparison with standing facilities. They allow central banks to limit their risks, adjust the terms of their transactions (such as amount, 
maturity, frequency, and tender system) to match market conditions, trade with more counterparties, and expand the assets backing 
market operations. 
28 For a thorough discussion of monetary implementation issues in transition countries, see Sundararajan (1997). 
29 More precisely, countries plagued by problems of excess liquidity where, in addition, resorting to the primary market of government 
debt as liquidity draining device entails coordination problems with the issuer (government) and, consequently, a deterioration in the 
operational independence of the central bank. 
30 The financial performance of central banks that still follow non-market-based monetary policy procedures is not easy to characterize.  
Non-market-based monetary policy procedures can be broadly defined as administrative measures aimed at the control of money and
credit without no regard for the willingness of the financial intermediaries involved to serve that purpose under those conditions. 
Non-market-based monetary interventions amount thus, ultimately, to implicit taxation-subvention policies across the financial system. 
From this perspective, the direct impact of non-market-based procedures on central bank’s financial statements from less developed
countries is any income obtained by the central bank from financial transactions penalizing intermediaries in addition to the cost
associated with the deployment of the necessary resources to manage the administrative system in place. 
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comparative perspective.  However, a brief summary of standard aspects of the process will be 
helpful to introduce the concept of central banks short-term interest rate risk exposure. 
The immediate step whereby monetary policy control actions find a reflection in the balance sheet 
of the central bank is the phase of liquidity control of the reserves market. The gross magnitude of 
those actions depends on a diverse set of conjuncture, institutional and strategy factors. In some 
countries monetary authorities force deposit institutions to periodically keep as reserves in their 
central banks some fraction of the transactional deposits maintained by their customers31. This 
forced demand for reserves brings about recurring refinancing needs for commercial banks, whose 
magnitude is modulated by the evolution of autonomous factors contributing to liquidity creation or 
destruction in the reserves market. Refinancing operations are thus conducted, generally speaking, 
with the neutral objective of covering aggregate remaining reserve needs as well as the policy one 
of driving the pricing conditions in the reserves redistribution market (interbank deposit market). 
Reserve requirements have been sometimes used also as instruments to levy taxes on the financial 
industry. Although lacking a reserves requirement system, the “deposit cash ratio” envisaged by the 
Bank of England Act 1998 to fund its non-remunerated operations (monetary policy and financial 
stability) illustrates a modern update of an old solution32. However, altogether both reserve balances 
and refinancing operations have normally evolved to have a very limited quantitative impact on a 
central bank’s financial position. On the latter count, one should notice that, to the extent that the 
policy objective requires just an influencing ability on money market rates in the margin, just a 
minor part of the central bank balance sheet needs to intervene. Notice the coincidence of this 
perspective with the remarks by Friedman (1999) on the disparity between the size of open market 
operations and the one of the markets that they are supposed to drive. Namely, Friedman makes the 
vivid example that the difference between a tight and lax monetary condition in the US in a given 
year corresponds to a tiny difference between net purchases of securities by the Federal Reserve 
over the period33. Consistent with that argument that emphasizes the policy relevance of conditions 
at the margin, it needs to be stressed the bulk of the central bank balance sheet can deviate in 
practice from Cagan’s theoretical recommendations. This is often in practice the case and, therefore, 
a sort of validation of the central bank asset side irrelevance proposition outside a pure theoretical 
frame. 
Sure enough, central bank refinancing outstanding balances are often moderate in relative terms 
(see chart 1). A diverse set of forces, most notably a trend towards a market-based approach to 
policy-making, has driven ratios of required reserves to low values, close to their technical 
minimums. This effect is still more noticeable where financial innovation/deregulation, allows 
depository institutions to economize on reserves requirements, as exemplified by the sweeping 
                                                     
31 In other countries, additional required balances are envisaged. For example, in the US depository institutions that use Federal Reserve 
payment services may establish the so called clearing balances. Their nature would recommend dealing with their financial implications 
(minor ones) in section 4.4.3. However, they are referred to here for the sake of completeness, because their dynamic is partially linked to 
the one of required reserves (for details see Meulendyke (1998).  There are also countries, like Australia, Canada, the UK or Denmark, 
where there is no reserve requirement system in place. Thus settlement balances determine in the margin money market rates. The Danish 
system is specially peculiar due to the fact that the central bank can be said to intermediate to some extent the money market.  However, 
the effect is largely neutral on central bank finances. 
32 Under the cash ratio deposit scheme, certain institutions authorised under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to accept
deposits (such as banks and building societies) place non-interest bearing deposits at the Bank of England.  The Bank invests these
deposits and the income earned is used to fund the costs of the Bank’s sterling liquidity, monetary policy and financial stability
operations, which benefit sterling deposit takers. In this regard, it is important to remind that in the UK seignorage from banknote
issuance flows directly to the government. The ratio (currently, 0.15% of eligible sterling deposits over a threshold) is set by the 
Treasury. 
33 Namely, given the volume of total reserves the difference between a 2% and a 10% growth of reserves over a year corresponds to net 
purchases by the Fed of 1 billion or 5 billion of securities. 
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accounts practice in the US34 or where vault cash may also serve them to fulfil their reserve 
obligations.
In terms of financial impact on central bank earnings, the overall effect of small gross positions in 
the asset and liability side that practically match each other is inevitably low both in terms of 
income and risk, when remuneration of required reserves is analogue to the one of refinancing 
operations. As a matter of fact, situations close to income neutrality can also arise under schemes 
where required reserves are not remunerated as in the US. Regulatory forbearance with regard to 
sweep accounts and flight of deposits away from the “taxed” banking system can end up more than 
compensating the intended collection of income. In terms of financial risks, recourse to closely 
matched temporary operations allows central banks to limit their risks even if they expand their 
range of eligible assets. Importantly, such operations mitigate the need for these central banks to 
define, manage, and maintain significant capital or valuation reserves. 
Both outright and repurchase-based open market operations should refer to thoughtfully chosen 
underlying instruments. So far the optimal quality of government debt has been emphasized. 
However, outside ideal conditions other alternatives must be employed35. The set of issues that such 
departure elicits goes beyond the scope of this paper in its full entirety. However, it seems 
appropriate to make some remarks on the incidence of such second-best choice of underlying assets 
on central bank’s financial risk-return profile. 
One should notice first the deep differences between eligible assets criteria for outright operations 
and those relating to the underlying of temporary operations: whereas the former entail direct 
central bank exposure to credit, liquidity and interest rate risks, the latter alternative involves 
basically a contingent exposure36. As a result, acceptability criteria can be laxer. Blenck et al.
(2002) document how the criteria followed in the three main monetary areas for the eligibility of 
assets underlying operations substantially differ, depending on they being temporary or outright 
ones. Outright holdings tend to be restricted to government debt. The impact of direct credit risk 
exposure on central banks’ balance sheets will be dealt with later on. 
As regards temporary open market operations backed with risky assets, the basic observation 
profiling a central bank’s risk-return is that both the central bank counterparty and the name 
underlying the assets supplied by the former must collapse before the central bank incurs significant 
losses on its collateralized exposure. The use of haircuts effectively approaches exposure and 
collateral amounts, so that the uncollateralized part gets close to zero. Cossin et al. (2003) have 
derived an analytical framework to determine haircuts so that desired probability that the central 
bank will incur a (unitary) loss higher than certain pre-specified level (l) can be matched.  Although 
their results are derived for government debt collateral, they can be generalized for private assets. In 
other words, quantitative tools exist to measure central bank capital necessary to back refinancing 
lending exposure. Obviously, the capital is proportional to the product of l and the volume of 
refinancing operations (RF). One aspect not covered by the approach followed by Cossin et al.
(2003) is correlation risk. If private assets are acceptable as collateral, double-default may become a 
sensible concern. However, generally speaking, correlation risk is quantitatively of a minor 
                                                     
34 Since January 1994, hundreds of banks and other depository financial institutions have implemented automated computer programs that 
reduce their required reserves by analyzing customers' use of checkable deposits (demand deposits, ATS, NOW, and other checkable
deposits) and "sweeping" such deposits into savings deposits (specifically, MMDA, or money market deposit accounts). Under the 
Federal Reserve's Regulation D, MMDA accounts are personal saving deposits and, hence, have a zero statutory reserve requirement.
35 Examples of situations where the optimum might not prevail can be: (i) the government debt market dramatically shrinks (see Federal 
Reserve System (2002), for a systematic study of the alternatives thought out in the US for such a situation); (ii) the demand of 
government debt to back open market or payment system operations grows beyond available effective supply (taking into account any
existing segmentation in markets). The ESCB is an example of central bank reviewing its asset policy on the latter grounds. For similar 
reasons, in Switzerland forex swaps have traditionally been the primary instrument for managing bank reserves. 
36 Obviously, both classes share the costs required to run the systems in charge of screening and monitoring credit risk. 
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magnitude. This is specially the case if anti close-links provisions are applied to the universe of 
eligible underlying names by each central bank counterparty, i.e. if banks can not deliver as 
collateral paper issued from a company that would most probably share its destiny if it ever 
defaulted. In other words, there is scope for quite laxer criteria as regards the universe of credit 
names eligible for temporary open market operations in comparison with outright ones. Obviously, 
the analysis supporting central bank capital coverage of temporary operations should take into 
account any carry or liquidation costs from lower quality assets held in the central bank portfolio in 
the aftermath of some crisis. 
All in all, the eligibility frontier for assets underlying temporary open market operations can be said 
to be an awkward problem. Although the sort of financial arguments given before delineate part of 
the answer, operative considerations may alter the final response. Theoretically speaking, the 
eligibility frontier of private assets in terms of their credit profile should balance the benefits 
derived from the operational goals that justify its choice and the (contingent) costs that they may 
entail.
4.1.2. Foreign assets  
There are many rationales justifying that countries hold certain amounts of official foreign currency 
reserves. Trade and debt servicing reasons stand as the most basic motivation for holding foreign 
reserves. Exchange rate targeting is obviously a major reason to have the means to exercise the 
intended control on the external value of one’s currency, i.e. to intervene in the fx market.  The 
ability to exercise control on exchange rate volatility may also force to possess the resources to 
either exert smoothing interventions on the external value of one’s currency or to limit the 
dynamical range of overshooting situations. The widespread opinion also exists that the role and 
management of reserve assets should be conceived alongside external liabilities with a view to 
enhance credit rating standing and confidence. Lower in the ranking, but also important for smaller 
countries, stand rationales for holding foreign reserves based on microstructure grounds, so that 
liquidity and effective convertibility can be ensured. Domestic monetary policy implementation 
purposes may even lead to instrument operations in terms of foreign currency swaps37.
In terms of risk, the relevant variable is obviously central bank net exposure. In other words, gross 
exposures may offer a distorted view of actual risk. For instance, forex swap-based open market 
operations are by definition free from exchange rate risk38. The achievement of some policy 
objectives may even not require net exposure to fx risk at all. For instance, liquid foreign exchange 
holdings financed in the foreign currency may suffice for some fx-market microstructure goals, as 
pointed out by Archer and Halliday (1995). 
The size of optimal gross exposures is an awkward question being outside the scope of this paper.  
Mulder (2000) offers a review of approaches followed to determine it. Existing guidelines are not 
very precise, especially as regards a maximum figure. Respondents to the latest questionnaire on 
reserve assets management conducted by Pringle and Carver (2003) confirm the fuzzy nature of the 
problem. Countries that experienced important currency crisis in the recent past or that have 
adopted fixed exchange rate systems, like some Asian ones, have accumulated significant volumes 
of reserves39. Elsewhere the assessment of the success of sterilized intervention strategies has 
somewhat downplayed the rationale for too large holdings of foreign assets. 
                                                     
37 The shrink of the government debt market in Australia and New Zealand has driven these countries towards a practice that was 
traditional of Switzerland. 
38 Even if just one leg of the operation is recorded on-balance, the off-balance forward leg neutralizes currency risk exposure. 
39 In 2002, the volume of reserves in terms of GDP had a world average of 7.8%, whereas seven Asian economies had fx reserves that
accounted more than 30% of their GDP. 
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This view, along with clear priorities between monetary and exchange rate policies, has even led to 
extreme positions, like the one  posted by a Fed President,  who suggests that the Fed should 
disengage from foreign exchange operations completely40. The diversity of issues at stake when 
considering the optimum size issue probably hinders any general conclusion. However, the 
important thing for the purposes of this paper is the fact that, whatever the decision ends up being, it 
is grounded on sound policy considerations and supported by solid governance arrangements. The 
reason for this caveat is due to the fact that foreign currency reserves turn out to be crucial for 
central bank financial independence. In other words, all else equal an excess of foreign assets may 
end up compromising central bank financial strength. Consequently, foreign assets holdings due to 
rationales other than those corresponding to central bank mandates should be subject to special 
financial arrangements between Treasury and central bank if a financial distress situation could lead 
to distortions to central bank behaviour. 
The decisive role of foreign assets for central bank financial strength can be justified with two kind 
of arguments. Foremost, holding foreign currency denominated assets financed with one’s currency 
has a hazardous impact on earnings for obvious reasons: namely, exchange rate risk-based investing 
is exposed both to the gyrations experienced by the exchange rate and by the asset price itself. The 
exposure to currency risks does not necessarily imply some immediate damaging effect. For 
example, it is remarkable that the break-up of a hard peg may lead to large capital gains (even if 
hidden) to the monetary authority, if the defence of the fixed exchange regime has not exhausted its 
external assets holdings. Nevertheless, central bank financial independence might ultimately also 
suffer from such apparently beneficial event41, if it ends up leading to an inadequate distribution of 
central bank profits. As a matter of fact, absent an adequate central bank financial framework, a 
cash constrained government might have fiscal incentives to break up its peg commitment earlier 
than speculative attacks models usually assume. 
Focusing now the analysis on the effect of external assets price volatility, security and liquidity 
restrictions on eligible assets for investment have set in practice an indirect limit to the acceptable 
degree of sensitivity to market conditions that reserve assets may exhibit. In practice, this has 
traditionally implied a bias towards investments in shorter term assets. When the volume of reserve 
assets is large enough, liquidity and security requirements may apply to just some “tranche”, thus 
allowing a return oriented strategy for the rest of the portfolio. Altogether, the risk profile of net 
foreign assets imposes the need to apply risk-budgeting techniques so as to reconcile policy goals 
and financial strength42.
The second type of arguments to focus the attention on foreign assets holdings when discussing 
central bank financial independence issues becomes clear when one adopts a cross-country 
perspective on where are those holdings effectively booked, i.e. when one looks at the institution 
(central bank or government) that holds the title of property on reserve assets . Differences in this 
regard reveal that the rationale for reserve assets has not been interpreted uniformly across 
jurisdictions.  The assignment of property rights on foreign assets to the central bank or the lack 
thereof underlies the distinction sometimes made between narrow and broad oriented central banks. 
In this respect, it is noteworthy to mention that in most countries reserves are managed by the 
central banks, and in the majority of cases reserves are part of the balance sheet of the central bank. 
However, there are some significant counterexamples to such rule (e.g., the United States, the UK, 
Canada, and Japan), where reserves are formally and explicitly owned by the government, even if 
                                                     
40 See Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996). 
41 The perspective here is strictly a central bank financial one. From a macroeconomic perspective, such events are indisputably situations 
of  short term crisis and distress. 
42 From a central bank perspective, Lavigne (2003) sketches the elements of risk budgeting. 
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the central bank may still be closely involved in their management43.  Nugée (2003) presents some 
of the arguments for the different institutional alternatives, history and precedents not being minor 
ones. It is important to emphasize that the will to management assets alongside external liabilities 
happens to be an important reason. The important observation for the purpose of this paper is that, 
whenever reserves ownership falls outside the central bank, the allocation of earnings and risks 
arising from that portfolio correspond to the government budget, and, therefore, that leaves 
basically unaltered the financial position of the central bank. Interestingly, the questionnaire 
conducted by Pringle and Carver (2003) also reveals a sample of central banks that implicitly 
undertake macro-hedging activities without caring about the existence of financial arrangements to 
share risks between the government and the central bank itself. The first column in chart 1 conveys 
a comparison of net foreign assets as a proportion of total assets in a sample of central banks that 
includes the Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England, Bank of Japan and the Eurosystem. 
All in all, the main threat to central bank financial position from foreign assets holdings appears to 
be exchange rate risk. Unlike market risk, it is less susceptible to control. The ability to fully hedge 
the exposure with derivatives is normally limited both on practical and policy grounds.  In other 
words, it looks as if on a market value basis central banks’ financial statements must necessarily 
reflect as capital gains and losses the year-on-year gyrations imparted by exchange rate risk 
exposure, i.e. no margin for inter-temporal smoothing mechanisms like those operating in the 
domestic debt portfolio seems to exist.  However, this conclusion proves to be wrong. 
As it happened with the government debt portfolio, it is also a common misconception to 
contemplate foreign assets from an isolated perspective, i.e. just as an asset portfolio without 
associated liabilities. Not considering the funding of the assets may be a reasonable working 
assumption for the day-to-day activities of the portfolio managers. However, this paper intends to 
go beyond such a partial perspective. 
From a more integrated standpoint, it should be evident that the return of a highly liquid foreign 
currency denominated portfolio funded in that same currency will normally tend to be either small 
or negative. The inter-temporal properties of the risk-return profile of central banks’ uncovered 
exposures, although less evident, are very relevant for the purposes of this paper. Investments on 
short-term foreign currency denominated assets yield interest plus principal valued at the 
end-of-period exchange rate.  If interest rate differentials were unbiased predictors of future 
exchange rate movements, this would approximately imply that reserves assets financed out of 
monetary base would yield around the same return as short-term domestic currency denominated 
assets do.  However, it is well established that the “uncovered interest parity” theory performs 
poorly on short-term horizons. In a survey of 75 published estimates, Froot and Thaler (1990) report 
few cases where the sign of the coefficient on interest rate differentials in exchange rate prediction 
equations is consistent with such hypothesis. 
However, Chinn and Meredith (2002) have tested the hypothesis for long horizons and found 
empirical evidence consistent with it. Thus, from a longer term perspective [5 years, in Chinn and 
Meredith (2002)] time becomes a natural hedge to resort to, so that the otherwise 
contemporaneously volatile earnings from uncovered reserves can be smoothed out. Section 6 will 
resort to this conclusion to justify a proposal of minimum central bank capitalization across a cycle. 
Notice that the hedge is a statistical one and, therefore, no rule on the choice of the averaging 
horizon can be proposed a priori. 
                                                     
43 In the countries mentioned above, official reserve assets are held by local versions of the US Exchange Stabilization Fund, i.e. funds 
maintained by the government for the purpose of promoting the order and stability of the currency on the foreign exchange market. 
However, in the US the Federal Reserve System has gradually evolved towards a deeper albeit subordinated involvement in fx 
interventions. In particular, since 1980 an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act allows the system to invest its foreign-exchange
holdings in obligations of foreign governments and interventions are typically equally split between the Fed and ESF accounts. See 
Humpage (1994). 
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The discussion so far has made no distinction between the financial impact of unrealized capital 
gains&losses on foreign exchange holdings and realized earnings from their sale. Ultimately, this 
should not be a big surprise since revalorization and income are equivalent under a full fair value 
accounting scheme. Nevertheless, differential effects may arise if central banks also practice 
off-balance interventions44 whose market value is not accounted for in a symmetric way to the one 
employed for on-balance holdings. 
The reference to differential effects in the case of interventions based on derivatives is not intended 
to be an exercise of academic precision-making. Certainly, an asymmetrical accounting may be 
judged as an inconsistency from a pure theoretical perspective. More importantly, however, there 
have been important cases of asymmetrical accounting of off-balance based interventions that have 
led to situations of central bank financial stress. Price (2003) reports how back in 1967 the UK used 
forward transactions in a large scale to hide a wakening position of the pound and to delay remedy 
actions. Eventually, the devaluation could not be avoided. The financial impact of the strategy 
reached an accumulated loss around 6% of GDP. Certainly, this outcome did not impact directly on 
the financial statement of the central bank, given its condition of agent for the government in this 
case. However, the episode vividly illustrates the potential damaging impact of contingent 
exposures for central banks’ financial position. More recently, a similarly obscure accounting 
framework for forward interventions on the eve of the Asian crisis led to important losses for the 
Bank of Thailand. 
4.2. Credit policy 
Section 4.1 has discussed the financial implications of conventional fiat money backing policies. 
Now under the credit policy heading, the subject of analysis will be the rationales and implications 
of deviations from conventional central bank asset composition. 
4.2.1. Domestic credit policy 
Previous sections have established that the natural backing of base money is government debt. As 
pointed out before, this contention is not free from trade-offs if a world where private money is 
considered as a feasible alternative, or, if government debt markets are not sufficiently developed. 
The issue for discussion in this section is the realistic case of central-bank-issued fiat money whose 
cover is not restricted just to government liabilities, i.e. with private assets also eligible to back 
money. Leveraging on Cagan’s arguments presented above, it can not be said that central bank asset 
composition policy is neutral on the capability to exert monetary policy control. However, it has 
already been stressed the fact the relatively minor amount of central bank assets necessary to set the 
monetary policy tone determines that, in practice, the composition of the central bank portfolio is 
not  necessarily crucial from a pure implementation perspective in normal times. 
The assessment is more negative both in theory and practice when credibility considerations are 
taken into account. An outspoken credit policy entails various risks for central bank independence. 
By definition, credit policy involves granting guarantees to private borrowers45. If their pricing does 
not respect market conditions, a bold central bank credit policy poses the risk of interferences with 
fiscal policy goals. As a matter of fact, the risk is material even if the pricing ex-ante reflects market 
conditions: signalling effects can easily drive credit market conditions in the direction of central 
bank portfolio choices. As pointed by Broaddus and Goodfriend (2001), a quid pro quo approach to 
                                                     
44 In an off-balance intervention, a central bank typically defends its currency by selling spot the foreign currency borrowed through a 
forex swap transaction. 
45 Any credit title can analytically be decomposed into a risk-free investment and the sale of a put on the name underlying the credit.  
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inter-institutional relations counsels central banks not to interfere with fiscal policy if independence 
is a valued attribute. From a different perspective, bold credit policy would imply that central bank 
and financial intermediaries compete to some extent. The scope for perverse conflicts of interest 
capable of put at risk central banks’ reputational capital is obviously large. 
On the positive side of the balance, backing outside money with domestic credit would top up 
monetary income. However, the magnitude of its costs, together with the fact that central banking 
does not have profit maximization as primary goal, makes of domestic credit policy a rarity among 
central bank practices. Altogether, practice in the three main monetary areas disregards private 
securities as a vehicle to back permanent monetary base injections46. A central bank investment 
policy that deserves further research is one intended to balance prons and cons of private assets and 
formulated in terms of broad indexes of (private) assets. 
4.2.2. External credit policy 
Section 4.1 adopted the neutral position that foreign assets may naturally belong to central banks’ 
assets for various reasons, and, most importantly, for monetary policy targeting reasons. The 
discussion there focused on the exchange rate risks that holding uncovered foreign assets entail. In 
this section the focus is placed on the quasi-fiscal dimension that may derive from exchange rate 
commitments and from assets held for that purpose. From a principles perspective, it may appear 
inconsistent splitting in two sections the discussion on the financial implications of foreign assets 
held by central banks because of monetary policy reasons. However there is a reason for that. 
Namely, external credit is an outspoken policy in hard peg regimes that typically entails a running 
financial impact. In other words, under hard peg regimes it is no longer true that monetary policy 
operations aimed at controlling domestic base money have insignificant impact on central banks 
finances.
From an autarky perspective, it is obvious that granting external credit has no policy justification.   
However, external credit policy becomes crucial when exchanges with the outside world are taken 
into account, be it because of the intensity of trade or because monetary policy itself is imported.  
Even if the focus is outside exchange rate risk, external credit policy is still understood here as 
granting credit to foreign institutions in foreign currency.  In other words, the financial 
arrangements surrounding federal-like central banks, where granting external credit through 
intra-system accounts is implicit to the operations of the overall system, is outside the intent of this 
section. They will be dealt with separately in section 4.4.2. 
The main external credit based mechanism modulating central banks’ earnings has normally to do 
with the quasi-fiscal costs arising as a consequence of the automatic transfers of income implicit to 
exchange rate pegs. Under an exchange rate peg, just as exporters and importers may end up 
exchanging subsidies at each other’s expense, suppliers of capital inflows may benefit at the 
expense of central banks committed to parity maintenance. 
For several reasons, countries resist capital inflow surges47. The choices available to policy makers 
wishing to stem capital inflows are limited. Policy makers confronted with a surge in capital inflows 
can either implement some form of capital control, through either a quantitative restriction on 
inward capital movements or a tax on these movements, or attempt to mitigate the inflationary 
impact of these capital flows by sterilized exchange rate intervention. Sterilization is usually the 
first policy response to a sudden rise in financial capital inflows. Under this policy, central banks 
swap domestic securities, such as government treasury obligations, for incoming foreign assets. The 
                                                     
46 See annex 4 in Blenck et al. (2001). 
47 See Reinhart and Reinhart (1998). 
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net impact of a sterilization exercise is that the monetary base is unchanged, but the share of foreign 
reserves in central banks’ asset holdings has increased. 
Sterilization entails normally costs, as central banks either exchange domestic government debt for 
foreign securities typically paying lower nominal yields or take on the foreign assets and issue base 
money draining liabilities. Moreover, these swap driven sterilization costs are normally topped by 
the impact of tighter money market conditions in terms of higher central bank interest rate expenses. 
As implicitly admitted in the introductory statement to this subsection, sterilization costs are 
incurred with monetary purposes in mind. However, it is also true that the authority over the 
external value of one’s currency falls normally upon governments and that institutional 
arrangements are feasible alternatives to transfer sterilization costs to the budget48. From this 
perspective one can qualify central bank sterilization costs as quasi-fiscal ones, even if they literally 
do not conform to the definition given by the IMF49. The usefulness of such categorisation derives 
from the application to central banks of information provisions for quasi-fiscal activities similar to 
those contained in IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency50.
Generally speaking central banks from transition countries are more susceptible to any type of 
quasi-fiscal costs including sterilization-driven ones. For example, Hanke and Sekerke (2003) report 
how losses to Costa Rica from an exchange rate subsidy amounted to 4.5% of GDP or, similarly, an 
exchange rate guarantee on foreign currency deposits in the former Yugoslavia cost the central bank 
around 19% of GDP. More widespread are examples of bulky sterilization costs. Macroeconomic 
stabilization in emerging countries often entails the need to engage in some sort of exchange rate 
pegging as a credibility-enhancing device. Initial success in reforms leads quite often to explosions 
of capital inflows obeying to some degree an interest-rate-mediated feedback mechanism: efforts by 
the central bank to contain the inflationary and destabilizing effects of capital overflows by means 
of sterilization actually straighten money market conditions, what in turn attracts “hot money”. 
Latin America countries vividly experienced the operation of such a mechanism in the first 80s and 
90s51. Kiguel and Leiderman (1993) indicate that during 1990 to mid-1992 Chile's central bank 
losses due to sterilization policies were about 1.4 percent of GDP. Among other examples, 
Markiewicz (2001) estimates for the Czech Republic a loss amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP in 
1998. 
4.3. Financial stability policy
Monetary policy functions have long shadowed the key role played by financial stability 
motivations in the emergence of central banking. This short-sighted assessment has recently been 
surmounted under an interpretation of financial stability policy broader than a strictly banking 
policy based one. However, banking policy still remains the core element of financial stability 
measures. Banking policy may be defined as regular lending and emergency financial assistance to 
individual banks and similar institutions. The recurrent low risk profile of regular lending has 
already been covered in section 4.1.1.2. Therefore, henceforth it is considered to basically entail the 
provision by central banks of line of credit services to solvent but illiquid commercial banks in 
situations other than regular ones. Undisputedly, a central bank has a unique role to play as lender in 
                                                     
48 Exchange Stabilization Accounts (see section 4.2.1) may serve such purpose.  
49 The perspective adopted here resembles the one adopted by Mackenzie and Stella (1996, p.18), who define quasi-fiscal activities of 
central banks and other public financial institutions as “operations or a measures carried out by a central bank or other PFI with an effect 
that can, in principle, be duplicated by budgetary measures in the form of explicit tax, subsidy or direct expenditure and that has or may 
have an impact on the financial operations of the central bank, other PFIs, or government.”  
50 The IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency states in its item 74 that the annual report of the central bank should indicate any 
non-monetary policy activities conducted on behalf of the government. Here, a reinterpretation of this statement is considered so that 
whenever sterilization costs are significant an analogue transparency regime is applied. 
51 Kaminisky (2003) reviews the history of capital flows to Latin America. 
52 Goodfriend and King (1988) rightly compare private line of credit fees with penalty rates recommended by Bagehot. 
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liquidity-driven crisis situations, due to its ability to commit unlimited liquidity resources as well as 
to act with the required speed. In passing, let us remind that liquidity is by definition a wide ranging 
concept. In particular, one may also consider credit policies followed by central banks to cover 
timing mismatches in wholesale payment systems as an integral part of their banking policies. 
An ideal banking policy should be neutral as regards its impact on central bank’s financial position. 
In accordance with Bagehot’s classical dictum lender of last resort policy, an ideal banking policy is 
one whose implementation allows perfectly discriminating between solvent and illiquid institutions 
and in addition central bank funding is adequately collateralized. In other words, a good banking 
policy should not entail more financial costs than those needed to run regulation and supervision 
departments as well as a collateral management one, i.e. the costs needed to screen out and cover 
central bank exposures. Lending at a penalty rate, as also recommended by Bagehot, should help the 
central bank to recoup some those of expenses although its basic purpose is to discourage 
subsidized borrowing52. Significantly, the Federal Reserve System has recently joined the club of 
followers of Bagehot:  primary and secondary standing facilities with increasing penalizing interest 
rates define, respectively, a corridor for overnight interest rates and a lender of last resort facility53.
Consistent with their different purposes, it is worth to notice the broader set of eligible collateral for 
standing facilities as compared with open market operations. However, protection of the financial 
integrity of the central bank is still judged as a basic constraint54.
Elsewhere, central bank protection and splitting of monetary and banking policies has lead to 
outright departures from Bagehot’s proposition. Thus, in some jurisdictions it is understood that the 
banking system may sometimes be in a better position to act as lender of last resort and, in 
accordance with such view, open markets operations serve both for monetary and regular banking 
policy purposes. For example, Germany instituted in 1974 a Liquidity Consortium Bank 
(Liko Bank) where the various categories of the German banking industry and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank hold participating interests. In a crisis, the Liko Bank can grant short-term liquidity 
assistance to institutions which are considered to be solvent and have run into liquidity difficulties. 
The Liko Bank is financed through capital and reserves which can be increased by virtue of an 
obligation on the part of shareholders to make further contributions and by bills of exchange whose 
standing is assured by corresponding signatures of other banks. Such securities can be used as 
blue-chip collateral to obtain funds from the Bundesbank. In Tietmayer’s (1999) words, Liko Bank 
acts as a next-to-last resort lender. 
In practice, it may be far from true that banking policy has a mild impact on central banks’ financial 
position because of the difficulties to distinguish between solvency and liquidity problems. The 
viability of private liquidity provision to a stressed institution is often curtailed by doubts in the 
market about its solvency, so that recourse to lender-of-last-resort quickly precipitates, thus leaving 
the central bank not much margin to carefully examine its books. The scale of the problem is 
compounded when the bank facing a crisis is big from a systemic risk perspective. Dealing with the 
banking regulation and supervision arrangements necessary to cope with these and similar problems 
is obviously outside the scope of this paper. The role to be played by central banks in these 
arrangements is frequently a subject of controversy. However, informational economies and 
financial muscle reasons justify that central banks are involved in the prevention and management 
stages. At any rate, the relevant issue to consider for the purposes of this paper is the trade-off 
                                                     
53 See Federal Reserve System (2002). More precisely, just the second standing facility reflects analysis conducted by Bagehot on
financial stability issues. The adoption of the first corridor is a monetary policy implementation choice. 
54 Kaufman (1999) reports that under the old discount window program no Federal Reserve bank ever reported a loss on its loans, even
though 90% of the banks that received extended emergency credit subsequently failed. 
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inherent in the provision of banking system stability by means of lender-of-last-resort actions, i.e. 
banking system stability versus central bank financial deterioration as a result thereof55.
In order to tackle that issue, it is enlightening to consider the amount of the costs of banking 
instability. Hogarth and Saporta (2001) have estimated both fiscal and output costs of 24 major 
crises.  Although varying markedly from crisis to crisis, cumulative fiscal losses have been large –
around 16 percent of GDP for the whole sample. Banking crisis alone, i.e. excluding cases where 
both banking and a currency crisis took place, amount on average a less daunting 4.5 percent of 
GDP. However, this figure typically covers normal central banking profits several times. Thus, the 
scale of funding necessary in some banking crisis goes far beyond the sums which the central bank 
can provide from its own resources.   At such juncture, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) along 
with many others rate negatively the possibility that a central bank exercising supervisory functions 
might (temporarily) give up its monetary policy goal if a rescue operation needs to be funded.  
Obviously, this judgment is valid if efficient rescue funding alternatives are available that respect 
the joint offer of monetary control and supervisory functions. 
As a matter of fact, explicit deposit insurance has become a principal feature of policy advice on 
financial architecture partially on those grounds. Today, most OECD countries and an increasing 
number of developing countries feature some form of explicit depositor protection. Deposit 
insurance appeal is twofold. Firstly, it may contribute to the stabilization of the financial sector by 
avoiding bank runs. Secondly, and of special bearing on this paper, it may serve as a budgetary 
buffer to the banking crisis costs and, therefore, a seemingly costless solution. These interesting 
features may however come at the price of moral hazard. In this regard, central banks exercising 
supervisory powers have the adequate expertise to offer input in the arrangement of deposit 
insurance models that are both efficient and somewhat protect the integrity of the lender of last 
resort.
A key variable of deposit insurance schemes as regards central bank financial protection in a 
banking crisis situation is the amount of assets accumulated by the fund to cover outlays under 
normal circumstances. It is often acknowledged that it may be too costly for the banking system to 
maintain a fund capable of funding pay-out of deposits of the largest banks, so that IMF experience 
across countries shows that fund’s size targets should be set as some percentage of insured deposits 
that would enable to cover deposits in a number of medium banks’ crisis56. Thus, even normal size 
crisis might reach the central bank even with a deposit insurance scheme in place. Furthermore, in 
some jurisdictions loss-sharing agreements between the central bank and the deposit insurance fund 
are imposed because of the incentive problems that might arise between them57.
Further to the argument of impossibility of total protection, it may be added that deposit insurance 
schemes are normally insufficient to cope with systemic crisis. For example, the Federal Savings 
and Loans Insurance Corporation of the US ultimately bankrupted in 1992 after accumulating large 
losses throughout the 80s due to the Savings and Loans crisis and being recapitalized in several 
occasions. The ensuing reform in US regulation biased the crisis funding burden away from 
taxpayers towards prompt action and co-insurance solutions58. Notwithstanding the possibility of 
such a resolution funding approach, in many cases there is no other alternative than resorting to 
                                                     
55 Notice that a hypothetical quest for central bank financial insulation in a banking crisis situation should not be understood as 
synonymous of policy indifference to it. In fact, the latter can seldom be the case since a banking crisis almost inevitably brings about 
alterations in money demand and output gap in the short and medium term. 
56 For a survey on deposit insurance models see García (2000). 
57 In the US, the FDICA, in addition to limit discount window lending to undercapitalized banks, also specifies that the Board of
Governors shall be liable to the FDIC, if additional credit is extended to a critically undercapitalized bank 5 days after the bank is so 
classified. The issue at stake is the possibility that lender of last resort action may be stripping bank’s collateral and thus stripping 
enlarging the risk for the deposit fund. 
58 See Ely (1999). 
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taxpayers pockets. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995), reporting how major crisis up to 1993 have 
been handled and financed, confirm that the balance of funding has effectively shifted in time to 
using taxpayers’ money and in very few occasions central bank’s money has paid the bill. Special 
funds have thus been put in place by the government in Sweden, Japan etc. to channel budget 
funds59.
However, it seems important to emphasize that the outlined trend towards budgetary forms of crisis 
funding does however not preclude that central banks have sometimes to urgently have to post 
advances. In emerging countries, lack of institutional development or limited access to capital 
markets may hinder banking crisis resolution schemes that would leave unaltered central bank’s 
balance sheet. Jacóme (2001) documents several cases in Latin America where the central bank was 
directly involved in the crisis resolution. The major flaws in monetary legislation in the period 
covered by the study refer to the absence of limits to the engagement of the central bank in 
lender-of-last-resort operations in most countries. The pursuit of central bank financial 
independence advices to adequately enshrine in law the terms for funds restitution to the monetary 
authority of funds advanced60 or costs incurred. 
Protracted situations of systemic crisis can lead to significant departures of central bank balance 
sheet structure from orthodox standards. Japan is a paramount example of novel balance sheet 
policies aimed at maintaining financial stability. Ample provision of liquidity to ensure that banks 
could meet their funding needs without difficulties has implied the adoption by the Bank of Japan of 
a program of outright government debt purchases since end 2002. A more radical departure from 
the classical orthodoxy elicited by Cagan have been the Bank of Japan initiatives to buy 
asset-backed securities in order to strengthen the monetary transmission mechanism as well as its 
program to help banks reduce their equity risk by buying banks' shareholdings. Ultimately, one 
interesting perspective, where these measures welcomed by the IMF61 may be framed, emphasizes a 
substitution relationship between Japanese commercial banks (insufficient) capital and central bank 
equity. The Chilean case can be said to also fit to some extent such a description. The costs of the 
banking crisis in the first 80s were massive and mostly borne by the central bank, which initially 
funded emergency loans with bond issuance. Subsequent compensation by the government with 
long-term dollar denominated government liabilities exposed the central bank to peso appreciation 
in the 90s. As a result, the Central Bank of Chile has long exhibited since then negative net worth 
and losses. However, the Chilean economy recovered from the banking crisis at a higher pace than 
other count.
As a conclusion to this section, the usual reminder applies that the first-best response to financial 
stability risks is always obvious:  a robust regulatory regime for the banking and financial sectors 
should be in place so that the scale of failures is limited by an incentive structure that reduces the 
incidence of bad banking and through early intervention of the authorities in failing banks.  The 
financial component dealt with in this section emerges when the first-best policy fails.  Contingent 
planning and financing sources should be in place to cope with the problem. Honohan (1999) 
sketches a methodology for fiscal planning for banking crisis. Although the budget is the natural 
funding mechanism for crisis resolution costs, the participation of the central bank may eventually 
also be decisive as financing-bridge solution before permanent ones are implemented. Even this 
limited role imposes to maintain a capital buffer to cope with some stylized “normal” crisis. The 
problem formulation is in its essence not much unlike the one faced by central counterparties, which 
must arrange the financial means to cope with the failure of some maximum of member failures. 
However, an important difference also exists. Budgeting for financial crisis should respect the 
                                                     
59 See Enoch, Garcia and Sundararajan (2001). 
60 Jacóme documents that Central Bank of Venezuela still maintains claims against the government for the assistance provided to the 
financial sector during the systemic banking crisis in 1994.  
61 See IMF Article IV Consultation with Japan, Public Information Notice (PIN) N.º 03/112 September 5, 2003. 
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conclusions derived from policies of constructive ambiguity with regard to the magnitude of rescue 
operations in situations of crisis. Notwithstanding this constraint, the size of the capital buffer for 
financial stability reasons should exhibit a scale corresponding to some characteristic size of the 
banking system. 
4.4. Balances and income items arising because of other reasons 
4.4.1. Gold holdings
Definitively, the role of gold holdings in modern central banking is a subtle issue. Central banks 
still account for around one fifth of the world’s gold in circulation. Official holdings of gold on 
average represent 11-12% of reserves, whereas in the EU the percentage is over 25% and the USA 
holds around 60% of its reserves in gold (outside the central bank). Obviously, one of the reasons 
for such large gold holdings in the official sector has to do with its past role as monetary policy 
anchor. Central bank gold reserves played by definition a key role under the gold standard, where 
the purchasing power of money was tied to the price of gold. As a matter of fact, one does not need 
to go back to the 19th or beginning of the 20th centuries to justify the prominent role for gold in 
monetary policy. Indeed gold can be said to have been the ultimate reserve asset under the Bretton 
Woods system, since at the heart of that international monetary arrangement was the US, ready to 
convert official dollar holdings in gold as requested. Strictly speaking, the move to fiat money made 
central bank gold reserves obsolete from a strict monetary perspective62 63. From a financial 
perspective, gold is also a rather unique type of asset: its returns are basically based on capital gains 
& losses, because it yields very low convenience interest in the market for gold loans and swaps64.
In other words, at first glance gold looks like a problematic investment from a central bank 
perspective because of the seemingly unjustified renounce to income and exposure to risk. 
Moreover, no natural cycle for gold value can be theoretically ascertained. Reliance on gold 
investments has even led some commentators to compare some central banks investment strategies 
with those of some hedge funds [see Gross and Schobert (1999)]. 
However, a more balanced assessment of gold is needed.  The key insight to identify a role for gold 
in modern central banking relates to the source of its arcane attraction among private investors: gold 
is perceived as a natural shelter investment for times of crisis. The fact is that their financial 
stability functions expose central banks financial performance precisely around times of crisis. 
Central bank gold holdings find thus support in that they may act as a natural hedge for the rest of 
their balance sheet. Obviously, such a case for gold can never be an unconditional one. Just a 
thorough assessment of overall risk can justify its precise weight in the portfolio. Ultimately, the 
difficulty to grasp the role of gold also stems from the difficulty to figure out the probability and 
financial impact of rare crisis events. As a matter of fact, even the nature of the shocks can be 
controversial. For example, Bernholz (2002) has defended in Switzerland the case for gold as 
vehicle of value immune to adverse international political developments, following the traditional 
neutrality position of the alpine country. 
                                                     
62 Nowadays, article IV 2(b) of the “Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund” goes as far as to forbid members states to 
peg their currency to gold.  
63 A reaction to the private market fears of uncoordinated official detachment from the gold market was the signature in 1999 of the 
Washington Agreement on Gold. The 15 signatory central banks agreed to contain their collective sales in a five year horizon expiring in 
2004 to the 2,000 tones already planned to be sold before the signature. 
64 Gold loan rates amount to just few basic points. Moreover, it must be noticed that central bank gold lending must involve a careful 
balance decision to avoid granting ammunition to bearish speculators and containing credit risk exposure from gold loans to miners. 
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4.4.2. Operation of a federal central bank system: intra-system accounts 
A federal central bank system exhibits a more complex pattern of features than the ones of an 
isolated one. The keys to this higher complexity are multiple. One may summarize most of them 
under a common label: “mechanisms and arrangements that ensure the fulfilment of the achieved 
agreements on decentralization of both policy-decision-making and implementation”. However, 
from a central bank financial independence perspective two are the decisive issues to look at, when 
assessing federal central banks. Firstly, one must carefully consider the federative concept in place 
as regards both central bank earnings generation and distribution as well as recapitalization, i.e. the 
degree of differentiated clienteles that intervening central banks face. From this perspective, one 
could say, for example, that the ESCB is an imperfect federation in comparison with the Federal 
Reserve, because of the multiplicity of constituencies that the former system faces65. Secondly, one 
must also examine the implications of the balance sheet-based links between the central banks of 
the system which underpin its capability to act as federal monetary authority. 
Let us elaborate on one mechanism leading to balance sheet links between central banks in a federal 
system66. Basic to the working of a common monetary policy is the capability to effectively impart 
common monetary impulses to the diverse sub-areas comprising the region. For that to be the case, 
it is not enough to establish a central decision body 67 with the power to set a common reference 
interest rate. In addition, mechanisms must also be deployed that further a harmonious functioning 
of the transmission channel across sub-areas. A minimum requirement for that is the ability to 
smoothly arbitrage out any divergence in short-term interest rates across the area. In turn this 
imposes the need of connected wholesale payment systems enabling an efficient and secure transfer 
of funds. 
The key point now for the arguments about financial strength is that the provision of such a 
cross-border payments mechanism in a federal central bank entails reciprocal lines of credit 
between central banks of the system. Let us illustrate the issue with a stylized example: A financial 
institution with an account with Central Bank A wants to transfer funds to another financial 
institution with an account with Central Bank B. In order to execute the transfer order, Central Bank 
A reduces its liabilities with a debit to its Deposits-Financial Institutions account and credits an 
intra-system account representative of the service that Central Bank B provides in the completion of 
the order. The service is as follows: Central Bank B acknowledges the performance of the payment 
to the payee by automatically increasing its liabilities with a credit to its Deposits-Financial 
Institution account, and debits its intra-system account with Central Bank A. 
In other words, cross border payment systems in a federal central bank system68 impose the 
existence of creditor-debtor relationships between central banks in the area. This fact together with 
the federative concept in place, make of intra-system financial arrangements a very important issue. 
For example, the confederative-like nature of the ESCB determines that Target-related balances 
accrue interest as opposed to Inter-district Settlement Accounts enabling settlement between 
                                                     
65 Neither, the ESCB or the Federal Reserve System are legal persons. However, in the political parlance one should speak of the Federal
Reserve System as of a purely federal system, whereas the ESCB is a sort of confederation one. The ultimate difference lies obviously in 
the multiplicity of sovereigns involved in the latter. 
66 In addition to the mechanism that will be described in this section, also banknote issuance, cost-sharing agreements or shared
investments cause financial inter-linkages between central banks of monetary federation to arise. For example, central banks belonging to 
the Eurosystem formally issued banknotes according to their respective capital keys in the ECB. However, the actual placement of
currency by each national central bank has respected existing demand in its country. The difference between both figures leads to
intra-system credits. Importantly, the presence of this system of intra-system credits determines a risk-sharing mechanism between
member central banks with regard to the impact on their financial independence from developments in banknotes migration inside the
area (see comments on central banks “scale” risk in section 4.1.1.1). 
67 FOMC in the Federal Reserve System, or the Governing Council in the ESCB. 
68  Fedwire, in the Federal Reserve System, or Target in the ESCB. 
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districts in the Federal Reserve System69 70. In the same vein, as ECB does not itself put “its” euro 
banknotes in circulation it is not possible that assets covering them grow automatically out of 
operational mechanisms as described in section 4.1.1.1. Rather, Eurosystem national central banks 
do this for the ECB and, consequently, the ECB holds remunerated intra-Eurosystem claims on 
national central banks. 
Having impact on earnings, it is evident that intra-system accounts are also relevant from a central 
bank capital perspective. However, restricting the relevance of intra-system accounts on central 
bank capital issues operating via an accumulation/depletion mechanism fails to consider an 
extremely important alternative channel. In other words, central bank members must be, not only 
equipped with the appropriate means to ensure that their system-related tasks can be properly 
performed, but also they must be prepared to meet with autonomy the exposure to different 
intra-system originated risks. 
Garber (1998)  has given a lucid albeit gloomy view of the intra-system sort of risks faced in a 
confederative central bank system.  The reciprocal credit provided between central banks so as to 
achieve the perfection of a cross border payment likens during a crisis period the nature of the 
funding mechanism underlying the Very Short Term Financing Facility (VSTFF) under the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for currency crisis restraint. A crisis in both contexts 
amounts to a sudden outflow of money from one area to the rest. The similitude lies in the fact that 
in both systems central banks from countries or districts not affected by the crisis are responsible for 
providing credit to the central bank facing difficulties71. The relevant question now, as it also was in 
the past under the ERM, is the following one: are there no actual limits to the otherwise 
theoretically unlimited amount of intra-system credit granted to central banks facing problems in a 
federal system? 
The force of unpredictable events can never be underestimated and it is always advisable to put 
oneself on the safe side. Reasoning along this conservative line, the situation of concern one must 
consider in a confederative system as a stress-testing exercise is one where sovereign governments 
put under question their willingness to permit their national central banks to provide each other 
unlimited credit in a crisis scenario. The maintenance of a capital buffer by central banks in a 
confederative system for such stress scenarios should contribute positively to create a confidence 
climate necessary to manage cooperatively local crisis episodes. 
It is important to emphasize that the need of such a capital buffer arises out of the consideration of 
sudden increases in intra-system credit in hypothetical crisis contexts. Intra-system credit per se 
should not be a problem if its size is contained or if it is regularly settled. In the Federal Reserve 
System the cumulated claims against or obligations to the Interdistrict Settlement Account of each 
central bank are settled once per year in April with the redistribution of gold certificates from 
district Feds with a negative cumulated net payment position to those with a positive position. In 
addition, the settlement is combined with the determination of each Bank's share of the System 
Open Market Account (SOMA)72.
                                                     
69 The Interdistrict Settlement Account (ISA) is the account used by Reserve Banks to clear transactions. At the close of business each 
day, all Reserve Banks assemble the payments due to or from other Reserve Banks as a result of transactions involving accounts residing 
in other Districts that occurred during the day's operations. Such transactions may include funds settlement, check clearing, Federal 
Reserve Note shipments and automated clearinghouse operations. The cumulative net amount due to or from other Reserve Banks is 
reported as the "Inter-district settlement account." The balance in this account represents a Bank's net asset or liability position with the 
other 11 Reserve Banks.  Although it is reported in the asset section on the individual district balance sheet, this account can be either an 
asset or liability, depending on whether it has a debit or credit balance. System-wide, the sum of all 12 Reserve Banks' ISA must equal 
zero.
70 As it will be mentioned later, ISA balances determine nonetheless the share of each district Fed in the SOMA account and therefore the 
profits earned.  
71 The gloomy part of Garber’s exercise is the identification of different causes of crisis.  
72 See Meulendyke (1998). 
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4.4.3. Services provision issues 
Central banks across the world tend to be involved in other lines of activity, in addition to the ones 
described so far. The purpose of this section is not to address the contentious issue of the scope of 
central bank functions. It is not intended to discuss issues on efficient supply either. The uniqueness 
of some of the activities of central banking, the difficulty in measuring some of the central banking 
outputs, and the multiplicity of objectives pursued by central banks complicates the application of 
standard efficiency measurement techniques73. Benchmarking and other efficiency measurement 
techniques are certainly very important in a financial independence set up. As already advanced in 
the introduction, accountability is outside the scope of this paper. Rather, the intention here is to 
highlight some challenges raised by central bank financial independence in respect of issues 
pertaining to the supply of services by central banks. 
Central banks are typically closely involved in the operation of parts of the national payment 
system. This is almost always the case as regards wholesale payment systems and in some cases this 
involvement also extends to retail payment systems. The Federal Reserve System is a significant 
case in that regard. According to the Rivlin report of 1998, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks 
processed about one-third of the estimated 45 billion checks transferred between banks in the 
United States in 1996, in addition to wholesale and other payment services. Central banks, 
especially in transition countries, may also experience the need to provide infrastructure for general 
markets development. More importantly, central banks exercising supervisory powers must decide 
how to fund their supervision operations. 
Normally, the financial muscle of central banks determines that funding the expenses incurred in the 
provision of services does not entail any material difficulty. Nevertheless, when this is not the case, 
budgetary transparency is advised as a mean to alleviate any financial independence concern. As 
mentioned, the realistic problem is rather one of excess of resources. Actually, over time the 
development of financial systems quite often determines that funding the services provided by 
central banks for historical reasons becomes a cross-subsidization problem, if alternative providers 
of the services are affected by the privileged funding of a central bank. Let us illustrate the issue 
with two cases affecting the Federal Reserve System. 
Green, Lopez and Wang (2003) describes how until 1980, the prices the Federal Reserve charged 
for payment services were not systematically linked to its costs74. That year, in an effort to promote 
a more efficient national payments system, US Congress passed the Monetary Control Act (MCA), 
with the aim of encouraging more competition between the Federal Reserve and private sector 
providers of payments services. The MCA now requires the Federal Reserve Banks to charge fees 
for their payment services that will recover all direct and indirect costs of services provision. The 
MCA also requires now that Federal Reserve Banks recover imputed costs –i.e., the costs that 
would be paid if the services were provided by a private firm, which include items such as the cost 
of capital. 
A similar problem was recently highlighted by the Comptroller of the Currency before 
the US Senate Committee on Banking75. The head of the supervisory body of the US national 
system of banks complaints about the continuing incentive of this group of banks to convert to the 
“state charter” status with the intent to fall under the umbrella of either the Federal Reserve or 
                                                     
73 Mester (2003) deals with the specifics of efficiency measurement in a central banking environment. 
74 Some commentators hint the potential danger of such policy in terms of dynamical inefficiency of the US retail payment system [see 
Lacker and Weinberg (1998)]. 
75 Statement before US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs complying with 12 US paragraph 250, April 23 2002. 
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the FDIC, which allegedly price modestly supervision services because of their alternative earnings 
sources.
Being these unfair competition problems important, because of their potentially reputational costs, 
they are nevertheless out of the scope of this paper as well as financial accountability issues. 
However, as regards the pricing of central bank exclusive services directly aimed at financial 
institutions, section 5 will support the view of a cost recovery approach with an imputed cost of 
capital equal to the interest costs of government debt. 
4.5.  Conclusions reminder 
So far we have seen that a central bank should normally make a profit because of its monopolistic 
position in the supply of currency. However, we have also considered various reasons that may lead 
it to experience financial distress. Sections 5 and 6 will, respectively, deal with the connected 
problems of how to finance such loses and distribute profits. In order to facilitate the exposition of 
the arguments in these sections, let us summarize the most relevant conclusions so far, especially as 
regards the sources of central bank earnings and their sensitivity. 
In a market value accounting benchmark, central bank earnings ? obtained in the exercise of its 
mandate can be conceptually separated in three different categories: normal earnings (?n), capital 
gains & losses (?s) and extraordinary items (?e). In annex 1, the explicit form of this decomposition 
is derived in terms of information on balance sheet and rates contained in tables 1 and 2, as well as 
other information on central bank costs and fees. 
It has to be stressed that such decomposition is not just an accounting truism but it is intended as a 
practical tool. Drawing on the results of annex 1, the decomposition helps to convey two important 
conclusions with regard to central banks’ return on assets (rA):
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namely, 
? On a market value basis, returns are modulated by movements of exchange rates and bond 
yields, possibly leading to central bank losses if exposures are large enough. As a matter of fact, 
central bank exposure is typically such that they must face high financial risks and earn a 
relatively modest expected return. 
? On average, return on central bank assets normally entails a discount (d) over the financing cost 
of government debt (ig). The reason lies in the combined effect of several factors: the presence 
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of non-yielding assets, the on average positive slope of the yield curve (i.e., ig > ir ), subsidies 
granted in services provision etc. Notice that consistent with the assumption of a (statistical) 
validity of the uncovered interest parity theory, interest from foreign investments must be 
reputed for the current purposes as yield the domestic interest rate. Chart 3 shows the magnitude 
of such discount for the Federal Reserve System, a central bank that exhibits a bias toward 
higher returns because the whole government debt yield curve is eligible as fiat cover and 
which, additionally, has a low exposure to fx risk. 
Another advantage of the decomposition delineated before lies in the fact that it endows structure to 
any effort to project central bank end-on-period earnings and capital needs. Although the ultimate 
benefits of such decomposition will be clearer in next section, its intermediate benefits in terms of 
budgeting of central bank financial resources must still be stressed. Precisely, the goal of section 4 
has been, to a large extent, to elaborate on the financial budgeting implications of the diversity of 
central bank functions. Due to the density of arguments displayed across the section, it will be 
useful to highlight some of them as a reminder: 
? Government debt naturally covers fiat money. However, it is not the only solution, hence the 
diversity of central bank balance sheet profiles. 
? Reputational capital concerns limit the scope of credit instruments as cover of fiat money. 
? Stability of central bank returns is fostered by a high proportion of assets yielding fixed income.  
? On a long-term horizon, capital gains and losses of debt and fx holdings tend to be smoothed 
away. Holding debt to maturity and the (statistical) validity of the uncovered interest parity 
hypothesis are the conceptual conditions for such central banks’ earnings cycles. 
? The commitment to elastically provide currency leaves the scale variable for total assets outside 
the central bank control. Thus, forecasts on payment system technology, currency substitution 
or migration developments should assist central bank planning. 
? Both on-balance and off-balance items need to be considered. 
? Various quasi-fiscal operations or financial stability driven outlays may end up sweeping 
seignorage income in extreme situations. Accordingly, transparency, budgeting and contingent 
coverage schemes belong naturally to central bank financial planning. 
? Institutional design matters.  The precise content of central bank mandate, the specifics of the 
deposit insurance scheme in place, the central bank title on foreign reserves, the national, 
federal or confederal legal nature of the monetary authority, the size of the banking system etc. 
determine markedly different central bank financial profiles. 
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5. A Simple Model of Central Bank Capital And Practical Considerations 
5.1. The model
For the purposes of this section, the main conclusions from the previous section are twofold: firstly, 
it can not be excluded that central banks are financially vulnerable and, secondly, there is a 
structural bias for central banks’ return on assets to be lower that the cost of public debt on average.  
More specifically as regards financial vulnerability, it has been concluded that, on a market-value 
basis, central banks’ profit statements exhibit a noticeable responsiveness to exchange rates and 
portfolio assets’ values as well as to extraordinary events. Exposure to market and non-market risks 
thus determines a possible source of central banks’ solvency impairment. Certainly, central banks 
do normally not undergo bankruptcy procedures76. However, financial distress may damage the 
performance of their monetary policy mandate. The aim of this section is to discuss a quantitative 
approach to endow central banks with a robust financial structure. However, a realistic application 
of the methodology requires incorporating the institutional issues discussed in previous section. 
Blejer and Schumacher (1998) have pointed out the usefulness of VAR-like methodologies to assess 
central banks’ vulnerability in connection with market risk exposures. However, their approach 
misses two points. First, they do not recognize the adequacy of that methodology not just for the 
assessment of central bank solvency in loose terms, but also to establish a benchmark for central 
bank financial strength. Second, their assessment of solvency is partial because they adopt an 
incomplete view of central banks’ financial position, by not taking into account their earnings 
generation capacity. 
                                                     
76 However, there are exceptions among central banks having private shareholders. For example, the National Bank of Belgium envisages 
in its Statute (art.11) that it must be dissolved automatically if the losses recorded in the balance sheet exceed one half of the capital 
stock. 
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Against that background, this section intends to establish a simple benchmark for central bank 
financial strength, i.e. a yardstick for a balance sheet magnitude reflective of financial resources 
available to operate away from distress conditions. Although very much depending on the specifics 
of accounting practice, financial strength will be understood to be equivalent to a metrics of 
effective financial cushion against shocks that comprises primary equity, retained earnings, 
revaluation reserves and, eventually, other items like certain provisions in a general accounting 
setting. Obviously, under a full market value accounting scheme revaluation reserves are zero. The 
need for such a model has emerged recently in several fronts. Ernhangen et al. (2003) pointed out 
differences of opinion in the Swedish Parliament as regards the capitalization of the central bank. In 
Finland, the central bank has publicly opposed government plans to withdraw capital77. In Japan, it 
has been claimed that a successful program of reflation in that country faces a restriction, based on 
the alleged weakening of the institutional position of the central bank that would ensue if the 
program happened to erode its capital base78. The recent trend toward a market value accounting 
standard also touches upon the capitalization problem, as will be discussed in section 6. 
Two aspects of the model must be stressed beforehand. Firstly, it is intentionally simple. The rich 
financial structure underlying central banking operations described in 4 can be incorporated in more 
complex versions. In particular, the model assumes that financial assets other than foreign assets 
holdings do not entail market risks. This assumption can be relaxed, as pointed out below in this 
section. Anyway, as described in section 6 and annex 2, there are accounting reasons that support 
the emphasis on differences between market risk from holdings of foreign asset and government 
debt. Secondly, and most importantly, its formulation adopts the perspective of a social optimizer 
concerned with both the effects of a lack central bank financial independence, in a context of 
insufficient central bank financial strength, and the costs of excessive central bank capitalization. 
The former type of costs is modelled in a rather crude way. The earnings generation capacity and 
riskiness of the central bank balance sheet determine the probability ? that a capital shortfall 
eventually takes place. Under such circumstances, the central bank would eventually need a capital 
injection in order to avoid social or reputational costs. Obviously, this is more the case the more 
transparent is the accounting regime in place. Social costs arise in such context if the government 
can not overcome the temptation to make the capital injection conditional on some central bank 
concessions, such as directing central bank decision making. Alternatively, social costs might arise 
if the central bank practices self-restraint with regard to otherwise needed policy making decisions, 
just because they might drive it to a (costly) situation of distress. Anyway, it is assumed here that 
recapitalization requests by the central bank or an inefficient avoidance thereof entail a social cost 
(?) equal to the lost benefits of central bank independence79.
The costs of excessive central bank capitalization comprise any net expenses to the government due 
to the additional public debt that it must issue to finance its holdings of supplementary financial 
assets, i.e. the discount of return on central bank assets over the cost of government debt. It must be 
emphasized that the central bank financial strength problem is well-posed only if the government 
faces net positive costs from maintaining financial resources as central bank own funds. Otherwise, 
no disincentive for the government to maintain resources in the central bank would arise80.
                                                     
77 See Bank of Finland press release 8th May 2003. 
78 See remarks by Federal Reserve Board Governor Ben Bernanke of May 31 before the Japan Society of Monetary Economics in Tokyo 
criticizing that argument. 
79 Unlike what happens when the capital shortfall leads a private company to legal proceedings,  no bankruptcy costs arise in a central 
bank context. However, one can liken the social cost to the franchise value lost.  
80 This component of the problem is not an academic one. In the central banking domain, Ungern-Sternberg (2002) has made a strong
partisan case against too much capitalization of the Swiss National Bank. The Swiss social democratic party commissioned a report to 
Professor Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg on profit distribution practices followed in the Swiss National Bank. The core argument of that 
partisan criticism relates the high level of total capitalization achieved due to an allegedly low level of dividend payments. More 
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Ultimately, the central bank financial independence problem can be seen as just a peculiar sort of 
asset-liability management problem. Their policy mandate determines that central banks typically 
must assume high financial risks and earn relatively low expected returns. The optimal level of 
central bank capital amounts to be a sort of (costly) self-insurance by the government against the 
potential costs of a time-inconsistent behaviour on its side as regards central bank policy issues81.
As a matter of fact, the central bank financial independence problem has two components. 
Self-insurance must operate both over a short and a medium term horizon. We have seen in 
section 4 that the uncovered interest parity theory may act as an inter-temporal risk mitigating 
mechanism. Consequently, the level of short-term self-insurance may prove to be excessive from a 
medium term perspective. In other words, the interplay between risks in the short and in the long 
term determines, respectively, a higher and a lower level of optimal central bank capital. Thus a 
band of optimal capitalization emerges as the solution to the problem of central bank financial 
strength.
Mathematically, the short term social optimizer problem can be formulated as follows. Let us 
consider the profit decomposition introduced in section 4. If the minimum operational base for total 
capital is considered to be Ko, the probability of an end-of-period shortfall is 
? ? ? ?oesneo KKDPKKP ??????????????                           (1) 
where end-of-period expected or budgeted values for ?n and ?e are considered to enter this 
expression. A more structural approach should posit a model for the conditional probability that a 
shortfall would actually lead to social costs. De represents a measure of firmly expected dividend 
pay-out to the government. The monopolist position of central banks on note issuance and the 
seignorage obtained thereof normally underpin such strong expectations. De can be formulated 
informally, incorporated in the formal government budget or even enshrined in law. It can be 
specified as an absolute quantity or as a proportion of annual profits. No matter its institutional 
background, the relevant fact modelled by De is a restriction for a central bank to be able to endow 
itself with the desired level of financial strength. In this regard, a particularly perverse situation 
arises when advances of dividends are paid before the completion of the period. In that case 
dividends paid out may happen to exceed total central bank earnings, even if for involuntary 
reasons82.
                                                                                                                                                                 
precisely, the report reacts critically to the decision by the SNB in March 2002 to increase profit distribution from 1.5 to 2.5 billion Swiss 
francs and to maintain that constant level during the next 10 years, judging it insufficient. 
81 It is relevant to notice that the cost of the self-insurance can be somewhat controlled. Thus, some central banks have established
so-called own fund portfolios with the goal to obtain a yield-pick up for central bank capital over the overall return on assets that would 
otherwise be achieved. Therefore, broadly speaking it can be said that the composition of such portfolio favours spread over liquidity
more than it is the case with the rest of the central bank portfolio of financial assets. 
82 The Bank of Japan is obliged to pay a part of the final amount to be paid to the government at the end of the fiscal year by the end of 
November, in line with a guideline set by the Minister of Finance and based on the Bank’s projection of net income. As an example of the 
type of situation described here, in fiscal year 2002 the policy Board decided not to make such preliminary payment because there was a 
possibility that the Bank would make an excessive payment having due regard of the volatility expected for the second half of fiscal year 
2002 [see Bank of Japan (2003)]. 
47
The central bank capital benchmark K is then the solution to the following optimization problem 
? ?? ?
0K.t.s
KdKmin
K
?
???????
                                                                 (2) 
where the meaning of ? will be clear shortly. In the mean time, let us think of ? as being equal to 1. 
The achievement of analytical tractability leads us to temporarily assume that central bank 
earnings-at-risk obeys a normal law. Just to simplify a little bit further, let us assume that the only 
source of revaluation risk are exchange rate movements acting on foreign reserve holdings. 
Assuming De is formulated as an absolute quantity, drawing on (1) and the expression for ?s, the 
optimization problem for the case where De is an absolute value becomes: 
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where ? is the (proportional) volatility of the exchange rate  s and s0 is the exchange rate at the 
capital budgeting time. 
Bearing in mind the possibility of a corner solution, the solution K* to this problem is: 
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The normality assumption can now be relaxed to also consider finite variance distributions by 
setting some value to parameter ?. Stahl (1997) justifies the choice ?=3 for the Basel market risk 
rules83.
The solution C* is increasing in the exposure and volatility. Interestingly, the solution exhibits 
economies of scale with regard to distress costs, i.e. the analogue to Basel risk-weights are 
decreasing with the level of exposure. Ultimately, this can be attributed to the peculiar nature of 
distress situations of central banks. Unlike what happens with a commercial firm, where liquidation 
of assets in bankruptcy would most probably entail costs proportional to their size, the distress 
situation considered in this paper excludes liquidation. The fixed annual cost of deficient continuity 
justifies the economies of scale of risk exposure. 
The corner solution deserves some clarification.  If the appropriation of profits by the central bank 
were guaranteed to be always high enough, the central bank could operate in this simplified model 
                                                     
83 The goal of this adjustment factor is to allow coping with that fact that financial asset returns are “leptokurtic”, that is there are more 
“fat tail” events at the extreme of the distribution bell curve than a normal distribution would suggest. 
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without capital at all. Otherwise, capital should statistically supplement appropriated profits (if any) 
by a term reflecting risk exposure, volatility and costs of underperformance. Notice that if profits 
are negative, i.e. if the central bank faces running losses the solution also dictates that a capital 
injection should finance them. 
There is no analytical solution for the case of dividends proportional to total (positive) profits. 
However, this modality is deficient by definition, because it leads to automatic distribution of 
capital gains without regard for their possible reversal in the future. 
The full economic sense of the model depends on a specification for ?. It is not straightforward to 
offer an estimate for ? both on conceptual and technical grounds. However, a good proxy for those 
costs can be built on the basis of the recurrent benefits of going from high to low inflation that could 
be lost if central bank has finally to yield to political power. The basis for such identification is the 
well documented opinion that central bank independence must be credited with much of the merits 
of such transition. Dolado, González-Páramo and Viñals (1997) quantify the recurrent benefits of 
independence as between 0.7 and 1.3% of GDP per year. Accumulated cost should typically exceed 
the one-off impact. It is sensible to think that any incumbent having the temptation to influence the 
central bank will try to exploit his power as much time as possible. From this perspective, total costs 
could reasonably be defined as the yearly costs scaled by a measure of term in office. 
The medium term component of the social optimizer problem is the version of (2) adapted to 
incorporate the earnings smoothing impact of the uncovered interest theory. The floor to central 
bank capitalization Kf across the cycle that results follows the following expression 
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where ?uoi is the volatility measuring the degree of statistical validity of the uncovered interest of 
parity over the averaging horizon considered, i.e. the volatility of the residuals of a regression of fx 
returns over interest differentials. Notice that the relevant fact for the reduction of capital 
requirements across a natural cycle is the condition that ?uoi is much smaller than ?.
Chart 4 exhibits the upper and lower limits of the central bank capital band for ?= 1%,  ? = 15% per 
annum and inter-temporal smoothing coefficient= 50%.  Notice that the width of the bank increases 
with the level of exposure. 
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As warned before, the model assumes that government debt does not contribute to market risks. 
Annex 2 discusses the link between this assumption, decisions to hold investments to maturity and 
the accounting regime in place. If government debt holdings are managed according to some 
benchmarking strategy, the risk of capital losses can not be discarded. Analytically, the problem 
becomes more involved because total risk results also from the impact of the adequacy of 
rebalancing decisions. Therefore, one must resort to Montecarlo methods to simulate the risk of 
end-of-period capital losses in model (2). Importantly, the impact of a decision to manage 
quasi-actively holdings of government debt leads to artificially boost short-term risk if it 
disqualifies for a smoother accounting regime. 
5.2. Practical implications
The crudeness of the approach followed to determine the amount capital buffer hinders drawing 
strong quantitative conclusions. The set of risks faced by a central bank is more complex than just 
those arising out of exchange rate gyrations. However, the methodology employed is amenable to 
more realistic situations. Nevertheless, a set of important conclusions can already be extracted from 
the simple exercise carried out before. 
1. As pointed out by the governor of the Bank of Japan, a central bank should be concerned 
about the soundness of its capital base. A central bank should take risks commensurate with 
the capital backing its operations as commercial banks do84. If enjoying instrumental or 
strategic flexibility on the central bank side depends on having the ability to assume 
exposure to certain risks, the previous conclusion implies that government must back the 
delegation of powers with capital. 
2. As a corollary of previous conclusion, an inefficient central bank balance sheet structure 
may lead to a costly freeze of public capital. If this is the case, balance sheet restructuring 
should be undertaken. In particular, central banks own funds should be managed so as to 
                                                     
84  See Fukui (2003). 
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minimize government disincentives to maintain them. This calls for separate investment 
policies.
3. In an analogous way of thinking, inefficient central bank assets management should be 
discouraged by capital budgeting reflecting the strategic flexibility sought with those assets. 
4. The size of the optimal capital buffer depends on how central bank profits ? are allocated at 
the end of the period. If some amount of profits De cannot engross retained reserves, 
primary capital or reserves should be grossed up correspondingly. More precisely, in a 
scenario where De totally absorbs normal and extraordinary profits, C* offers coverage to 
capital shortfall costs. Notice that C* is an absolute value increasing less than 
proportionally with risk exposure. 
5. Capital shortfall risk has a short-term and a medium term-dimension. If inter-temporal 
smoothing of profits is allowed for, the medium-term capital coverage Cf is lower than the 
short-term one C*. From a different perspective, both measures would collapse to Cf if 
accounting were responsive to underlying economics. In other words, the gap between them 
is due to a measure of artificial vulnerability. Consequently, C* and Cf can be interpreted as 
measures of maximum and minimum capital. 
6. Financial strength requirements are responsive to the accounting regime. Conversely, 
adherence to conditions that allow qualifying for some accounting standard has an impact in 
terms of capital requirements that goes beyond the real risk profile of investment strategies 
permitted. 
7. From a worst case perspective, central bank total capitalization should be calculated having 
due regard of any justifiable safety margins for ?n and ?e, as suggested by Ernhangen, 
Vesterlund and Viotti (2002)85. The budgeting methods delineated in section 4 for potential 
losses arising in refinancing operations or in financial stability ones should form the basis 
for an estimate of ?e. As regards ?n, the Bank of Sweden considers a safety margin in their 
calculation of capital that is identified as a situation of loss of seignorage because of 
technology developments in the e-money domain. 
8. Institutional risk mitigation techniques alleviate the need of central bank capital. For 
example, the fact that capital losses on the issue department portfolio of the Bank of 
England do not show up in the central bank’s P&L but do in the National Loans Fund86,
diminishes the capital requirements for the central bank. 
9. In case of expected losses in recurrent and extraordinary operations, central bank capital 
should automatically be increased to cope with them. 
10. Provision of non-priced services leads to a need of capital if the resulting underperformance 
of profits hinders reaching the optimal level of total capital. A cost recovery policy for 
services pricing is fully justified on central bank capital grounds. Further to this point, 
capital budgeting in central banks’ services provision also implies a services pricing policy 
                                                     
85 Although the argument is correct on its own, the economic background where the principle has been formulated does not correspond to 
the setting of this paper. As pointed out in section 4.7, central bank equity has somewhat replaced the role of commercial bank capital as 
a complement to fiscal policy measures in the long standing effort to reflate the economy. The setting is thus one closer to one of 
cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy makers. From a similar standpoint, Bernanke (2003) has downplayed the appropriateness 
of central bank capitalization demands in such setting.  
86 In the UK, the National Loans Fund (NLF) is one of the main funds on which the Treasury operate. It has as functions to receive the 
proceeds and finance the repayment of all Central Government borrowing and the Exchange Equalisation Account, and to make 
repayable loans to various statutory public sector bodies. Profits from the Issue Department are also transferred to the NLF. 
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mindful of the cost of central bank capital. From this perspective, it is questionable the 
standard of cost described by Green et al. (2003) for the Federal Reserve System based on 
commercial banks’ cost of capital unless the fed competes with the banking sector in that 
area.
Drawing on practical item number 6, it is relevant to remark that budgetary provisions mandating 
automatic supply of funds to the central bank in distress could be, from a theoretical perspective, 
substitutes of central bank capital. However, the political difficulties of such a solution seem to be 
big. As a way of example, just 13% of central banks that responded to the Survey conducted by 
Central Banking Publications had in place provisions for recapitalization in case of distress. None 
mentioned flow-like solutions. 
Quite often capitalization measures are perceived as a substitute of other institutional steps. In 
particular, section 4 has identified situations where the poor financial performance of the central 
bank is due to monetary operations entailing quasi-fiscal costs. Institutional solutions to the problem 
have also been pointed out. However, arguably transparency as regards the origin of the deteriorated 
situation is just a temporary substitute of unconditional measures to strengthen solvency. 
Institutional measures can be a (second-best) substitute of central bank capitalization if they lead to 
an enforceable provision of (contingent) capital. In other words, the legal wording of arrangements 
substitutive of central bank capital should lead to similar economic outcomes. In particular, it 
should lead to more symmetry between the consequences for the government of central bank profits 
and losses. Ultimately, institutional measures aimed at substituting central bank capital should be 
cast in a broader context, namely the overall framework for the resolution of government-central 
bank conflicts.  However, in practice central bank law design has seldom paid attention to 
contingent capital provision. Actually, central bank financial profile is still not paid too much 
importance in qualified opinions on optimal central bank law design [see Poole (2003)]. 
6. Rules On Profit Distribution, Accounting Standards and Financial Strength 
Section 5 has dealt with the efficient coverage of potential central bank losses. Adequate central 
bank capitalization turns out to be one of the mechanisms. Central banks financial strength depends 
on De, i.e. on pay-out policy, because profit retention is a key mechanism to build up a capital 
buffer. Therefore, the relevant question now is how to distribute central bank profits, in order to 
make compatible the legitimate rights of its shareholders to receive dividends and central bank 
financial strength. 
6.1. Compatibility
In order to discuss this question, it is useful to identify profit distribution mechanisms that might 
lead either to outright incompatibility or to a suboptimal outcome. Generally speaking, 
incompatibility between dividend payments and capitalization arises whenever the amount of profits 
devoted to the former is considered to exhibit an unconditional priority. In other words, 
incompatibility outcomes emerge whenever dividend payments are made irrespective of the 
quantity and the quality of the profits. We will later elaborate further on the precise meaning of 
quantity and quality conditions for profit distribution. 
The way the quantity of profits should limit dividend pay-out is obvious: distribution should take 
place just if the profits exceed the amount allocated to the volume of reserves needed to comply 
with existing financial strength goals. However, the distribution formula is not a simple one based 
on a trigger level for profits. The fact that central bank financial strength has been formulated in 
section 5 in terms of a maximum and a minimum for central bank capital slightly complicates the 
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pay-out formula. Profit distribution policy amounts to a control problem of a state variable (capital) 
inside an admissible band. A level of capital over the upper border of the band (C*) is excessive 
and, consequently, accumulation of own funds out of earnings should be halted. As long as the state 
of financial strength exceeds the lower border (Cf), there is some margin to pay out dividends 
without impairing the medium-term central bank financial strength condition. However, some 
compromise must be found because distribution inside the band faces as an alternative allocation 
the improvement of the short-term financial condition. For example, one may prioritize on the 
short-term financial condition imposing that no allocation to distributable profits is made before C* 
is safeguarded. Alternatively, some other solvency point between C* and Cf might be preferred. 
Moreover, the size of any pay-out must be consistent with the fact that profits make an approximate 
cyclical “excursion” around some stable level. In other words, pay-out policy inside the band is 
constrained by quality of profits considerations. As it will shortly be clear, this constraint imposes 
determining dividends as a time average of past profits. So far we have always worked under a 
market value accounting benchmark. A full fair value approach treats equally any source of income, 
thus disregarding any differences between accrued income and capital gains as regards their 
reversibility, for example. Therefore, a market value based metrics for central bank profit 
determination fails to restrain the distribution as dividends of profits that exhibit some reverting 
behaviour, unless such is the will of the shareholder. In other words, a full market value approach to 
calculate distributable profits fails to automatically recognize the smoothness of central bank 
earnings over a long enough horizon, as pointed out in section 487.
Two types of costs can be expected from the adoption of an unrestrained full fair market value as 
accounting standard determining central banks’ dividend payment capacity. Firstly, the artificial 
image of instability of central bank earnings may act as a reputational charge. Secondly, the costs 
incurred in the reversion of the consequences of dividend payments whose amount turns out to be 
unjustified ex-post should also be considered in the bill. In this category are included the costs 
incurred to revert any inflationary effect that might be triggered by the distribution as dividends of 
unrealized capital gains88. The second concern becomes especially significant, if the probability is 
large, that an excessive distribution of profits might later lead to an ex-ante unneeded 
recapitalization. 
It is important to emphasize that these criticisms on full fair market value as standalone metrics for 
distributable profits has in essence nothing to do with the choice of market value as accounting 
standard. Similarly to the capital buffer problem dealt with in section 5, any metrics for dividend 
pay-out should be responsive to the accounting regime in place and to reflect the underlying 
economics. The application of this insight to the central bank pay-out policy problem leads to the 
conclusion that averaging of earnings across the cycle is needed to correct for the excess of 
volatility that unrestrained market value accounting might lead to. 
Let us now see with an example pertaining to the central bank’s domestic portfolio why an 
inter-temporal analysis of the financial strength problem leads to lower capital needs. Certainly, 
central banks’ government debt holdings may cause large swings to their P&L account on market 
value basis. However, from a consolidated perspective government debt holdings are no asset for 
the Treasury. Therefore, the impact of central banks’ government debt holdings on dividends 
received by the government is due either to time of trading effects or to the vagaries of accounting. 
                                                     
87 Sweden is an example of a country where the allocation of profits entails an average over 5 year’s of Riksbank’s earnings excluding 
exchange rate and gold valuation effects. 80 per cent of that average is distributed yearly to the Treasury. 
88 Let us illustrate the importance of this argument with a striking real case. Namely, fixed exchange rate regimes that turn out to be 
unsustainable and are the object of speculative attack may end up having the government as the surprising winner in terms of earnings. If 
no regard were paid to quality of profits considerations, incentives to commit to hard pegs would be much looser and the ensuing
spending spree could be significant. 
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To be more specific, if debt is assumed to be held to maturity –so that time of trade effects can be 
discarded– an interest rate swap between the central bank and the Treasury, whose overall effect is 
that the former ends up receiving floating over his entire portfolio, leads to a situation where capital 
gains and losses are no longer a threat for the central bank. Therefore, its financial strength problem 
is much lower. Instead, the Treasury assumes a floating rate based stream of dividends. 
6.2. Optimality
In the previous subsection, it has been concluded that De should respond to some time average of 
past profits. Optimality restrictions should help to propose some concrete functional form. A 
sensible definition of optimal profit distribution mechanisms should take into account any distorting 
effect of the distribution standard on the behaviour of either the dividends payer or on the 
recipient89. From this public policy perspective, optimal profit distribution mechanisms should 
exhibit several properties. 
Firstly, absence of distortional effects on fiscal policy is expected to impose the condition that no 
margin exists for active discretional decision powers on the government side on how to allocate 
profits. Baltersperger and Jordan (1998) make a similar argument. In other words, either a rule or 
the central bank should decide on the distribution of the excess profits over capital coverage 
requirements. Avoidance of risk of being perceived as a partisan institution argues in favour of the 
former option. 
Secondly, avoidance of incentives by the government to passively leverage on recent financial 
markets developments, even if they are outside its own influence, suggests the need to decouple 
profits distribution from current profit generation. In other words, distributed profits should average 
current and past earnings. Notice that this conclusion is consistent with the approach normally 
followed to assess the adequacy of the fiscal policy stance of governments in terms of a cyclical and 
a structural component. Thus, a different line of reasoning also leads to a profits smoothing 
proposal.
A third important optimality condition on the profits distribution rule should be one aimed at 
limiting any distorting consequence that a smoothing mechanism might itself cause. Namely, the 
distribution rule should be calibrated to the statistical properties of the earnings generation process 
so that central bank total capitalization does not end up being excessive. 
It is worth discussing the third condition in this section about pay-out policy optimality, because in 
practice earnings generation cycles are not perfect ones, i.e. the excursion that profits are supposed 
to make across a cycle might drive total capital over C* at some point. As a consequence of this, 
setting a fixed upper bound to central bank total capital eventually involves the delicate problem of 
handing out extraordinary dividends to a government in office, so that capitalization is restored to 
some acceptable lower level. The scope of this problem can however somewhat be mitigated by an 
adequate design of the profits averaging procedure. Once achieved the capitalization objective, a 
quick build up of reserves could take place if the dividend formula fails to be sufficiently responsive 
to the level of recent profits. Averaging over a too long period is a rule prone to exhibit such sort of 
problems. Thus, a subtle trade-off between the upper bound for reserves and the length of the 
running window entering the dividends smoothing rule must be considered. 
                                                     
89 One could equivalently subsume the compatibility requirement on the profit distribution rule as an optimality condition as regards its 
(neutrality) effects on some aspects central bank behaviour. 
54
In mathematical terms, if the priority is placed on the short-term financial solvency condition the 
dividend pay-out (Dt) should follow a rule that instructs the build up of some averaging fund on the 
basis of the existing excess of profits ?ex (over the level needed to maintain some level of solvency).  
One possible rule operating on the basis of a solvency fund F2 and distribution fund F1 looks as 
follows
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where Hx is the Heaviside function valued at condition x, i.e. Hx=1, if condition x is valid and cero 
otherwise; l is length of the running window over which average profits are calculated and k is the 
capitalization state. 
If negative profits ever exhaust the capital buffer down to Cf some capital injection to restore 
solvency to the solvency level prioritized. Existing funds in the distribution fund could eventually 
serve for that purpose. This is the role of the second summand in the expression for F2.
Norway constitutes an example of a country where a similar formula is applied. Allocations are 
made from Norges Bank to the so called Adjustment Fund until it contains 40 per cent of the Bank’s 
net foreign exposure and 5 per cent of its Norwegian securities holdings. If the Adjustment Fund 
ever exceeds that level, the surplus shall be reversed to the profit and loss accounts. If the 
Adjustment Fund falls below 25 per cent of the Bank’s net foreign exposure, a so called Transfer 
Fund is drawn until the Adjustment Fund is at its full size. The so called Transfer Fund is built up 
out of any surplus after provisions for or transfers from the Adjustment Fund. Every year a third of 
the capital in the Transfer Fund is transferred to the Treasury90. Effectively, the averaging period in 
Norway is three years. 
It has been pointed out before that setting an effective cap on total capital may be a subtle issue 
from an applied perspective. Extraordinary dividends might be needed to solve the imbalance. 
Another solution to mitigate problems from an excessive accumulation in an averaging fund is to 
establish separate investment policies for it, so that the yield discount problem pointed out in 
section 5 can be overcome. An extreme alternative of this solution could be the externalization of 
the averaging fund. 
6.3. The role of accounting standards 
The full fair value benchmark considered so far has revealed problematic for profit distribution 
purposes. These problems have lead to the proposal that central bank payable dividends should be 
mechanistically determined, so that certain total capitalization and quality of dividends goals are 
fulfilled. However, it is also noteworthy to remind that market value has also been recognized as an 
acceptable benchmark for central bank accounting purposes. It is time to reconcile both apparently 
contradictory statements. 
                                                     
90 The net foreign exchange reserves computed exclude the portion of reserves that are directly credited/debited to the Treasury. See 
Norges Bank Annual Report (2002).  
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A first observation illuminating such exercise of reconciliation is the recognition of the intrinsically 
different purposes of general accounting standards and the ones needed for an independent central 
bank.  Whereas general purpose accounting principles are aimed at serving decision taking by 
managers and shareholders, the very definition of an independent central bank, based on the 
negation of government involvement in its operations, supports the construction of a profit metrics 
that allows an harmonious coexistence of the legitimate rights of the government to receive 
dividends and the control of the central bank over its own financial strength. Ultimately this 
argument sets all conventional accounting standards on an equal footing as regards their 
applicability to central banking. In other words, some departure from ordinary standards is needed 
under market value accounting as much as is required under any other accounting convention. In 
accordance with previous discussion, the main elements of such departure are profit smoothing 
across exercises and priority on appropriation of central bank income for financial strength 
purposes.
As a second observation, it is also crucial to notice that no accounting solution for central bank 
operations should ever hinder their financial accountability. From this perspective, market value 
based accounting standards may enhance financial accountability of central banks, approximately as 
much as they do for the case of corporations. Market value accounting thus increases financial 
transparency by disallowing the built-up and management of hidden reserves. 
Based on both observations, one is tempted to conclude that some adjusted fair value accounting 
benchmark is capable of delivering the tool to reconcile central bank financial independence and 
accountability requirements. The crucial point for such reconciliation is the adaptation of the 
income generation and allocation metrics to match the financial strength and dividend pay-out 
formulae delineated in previous sections.  In other words, explicit smoothing solutions like the ones 
proposed make compatible central bank financial independence and accountability under market 
value accounting. Annex 2 briefly discusses to what extent other market value oriented proposals 
for financial instruments accounting, like IAS, allow for smoothing in income recognition from 
government debt holdings (under the available-for-sale category). However, foreign asset holdings 
are normally not granted such treatment. 
As advanced before, Norges Bank can be said to follow a market value based financial reporting 
framework with smoothing provisions. Other central banks having adhered to some market value 
accounting specification a la IAS have also altered it to some extent. For example, the ESCB has 
adopted a modified fair value accounting scheme. Karrer (2000) describes the differences between 
the reporting and accounting principles in the ESCB and the international accounting standards. 
One of the main issues where divergence arises is the treatment of unrealized gains and losses. In 
that regard, the ESCB has been driven by prudence arguments to adopt an asymmetric approach: 
whereas unrealized gains are posted for each asset class to a revaluation account in the liability side, 
unrealized losses are irreversibly recorded in the P&L when market prices fall below average 
acquisition cost for each class of security. Notice the emphasis in irreversible, i.e. no reversal of 
losses across exercises is allowed. The asymmetric approach to unrealised P&L recognition has the 
virtue of matching the asymmetric position of a typical central bank in relation with the government 
as regards its ability to control its financial strength. 
Notwithstanding the need for adjustments, the virtues of accountability provided seem to 
definitively favour currently market value based accounting standards. Some convergence can be 
detected in that direction under the auspices of multilateral institutions [see García Hernando (2002) 
and Kurtzig (2003)]. On the other hand, the need of adjustments also highlights the lack unicity as 
regards a definitive central bank accounting standard. Generally speaking, various accounting 
standards could be moulded to deliver acceptable solutions to the independence-accountability 
trade-off, if the central bank had the authority to reflect its financial specificities in it and an 
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appropriate accountability setup is envisaged too. In practice,  alternative accounting  solutions  to  
market  value  ones  are  those  based  on  implicit  smoothing schemes –mostly for holdings of 
government debt– that alleviate the pressure on short-term capital requirements. For example, the 
Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England still stick to proprietary accounting principles 
based on an amortized cost approach91.
In summary, the underlying economics of central banking precludes the blind translation of 
financial reporting schemes developed for the commercial world. The approach followed to adapt it 
to central bank reality may be diverse. Profit smoothing may be achieved either explicitly or 
implicitly. Appropriation of income for capitalization purposes may take place through special 
provisioning accounts, specific reserves or other instrumental means. The choice will be dictated by 
a myriad of institutional factors. However, theoretically speaking the different accounting 
alternatives can be compared and their equivalency tested if due account is paid of any hidden 
reserves, as integral part of the financial strength buffer of the central bank, and if the volatility of 
earnings is appropriately scaled down in accordance with the smoothing mechanisms followed. 
7. Conclusions 
Central bank independence has become one of the central concepts in monetary theory and policy. 
Practice and academic literature are almost unanimous in assessing central bank independence on 
the basis of a number of key factors, financial independence being one of them. However, limited 
attention has been paid to determinants of central bank financial independence.  This paper has 
intended to make a contribution to fill this gap. 
A financially independent central bank is considered to be one that exhibits the adequate balance 
sheet structure and earnings generation to efficiently perform its core functions.  From a long-term 
perspective, as far as the demand for banknotes is maintained seignorage waters down any central 
bank financial independence concern in developed countries. However, from a short-term 
perspective central bank financial vulnerability may condition its effective independence. Loss of 
independence may be due to explicit or implicit influence on decision making. One example of the 
latter can be self-restraint on the central bank side with regard to the adoption of otherwise needed 
monetary policy measures which might negatively affect its financial position. 
A part of the paper is devoted to the identification of the main financial risks to central bank 
independence. Another part is devoted to propose solutions to enhance central banks’ financial 
strength. The main conclusions gained in the analysis can be broadly summarized as follows. 
Central banks balance sheet structure is relevant both on operational and financial independence 
grounds. Different operationally equivalent solutions may have different financial implications, if 
they determine a different central bank risk-return profile. The systematic discussion of risks to 
central bank financial independence serves as the basis for central bank capital budgeting. As a 
specific application of these ideas, a Basel-like model for central bank financial strength and a 
formula for dividend distribution are proposed. Both elements are aimed at ensuring optimal 
consistency between the legitimate rights of the government to receive dividends from the central 
bank and the government commitment to guarantee central bank independence. Alternatively, the 
paper also admits as a second-best solution institutional arrangements whose economic effect is the 
provision of (contingent) capital to the central bank and, therefore, put the government in a more 
symmetric position with regard to central bank profits and losses; in other words, institutional 
arrangements whose economic effects conditional on capital shortfalls are equivalent to outright 
                                                     
91 The Federal Reserve prepares its financial statements in accordance with the so called Financial Accounting Manual that are believed 
to be more appropriate to the nature and functions of a central bank than GAAP. 
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capitalization. Obviously, one pre-requisite for those institutional arrangements is enforceability. 
Thus legal aspects, and in particular, adequate central bank law design with regard to central bank 
financial issues become a basic ingredient of central bank financial independence both under an 
outright capitalization or a contingent-capitalization solution to central bank financial strength.   
The underlying presumption throughout the paper is the idea that, even if legally independent, a 
central bank in a financially vulnerable position may happen to require fiscal support. If that ever 
happens, the risk exists that the government can not overcome the temptation to bargain and 
influence central bank decisions, thus leading to waste the social benefits of independence. 
Alternatively, the central bank might not implement needed monetary policy measures if they could 
end up driving its own financial position close to distress. Thus, commitment to central bank 
independence should ultimately entail also a financial dimension: the central bank should have 
enough resources to cope on its own with selected shocks to its finances. The emphasis on the 
“selected shocks” intends to reflect the caveat that, in addition to the benefits of central bank 
independence, society may also rate positively and wish to safeguard the special abilities of central 
banks in extreme systemic crisis situations. Notice that the arguments made also support a pecking 
order for the sources of central bank capital favouring internal generation. From this perspective 
cost efficiency becomes a crucial counterpart of the arguments made in this paper. 
Resources underpinning central bank financial strength should not be just commensurate with risks 
assumed, but also with the costs for the government of holding an excess of financial assets and 
with the social costs of central bank distress. Risks are assumed to be exogenously determined by 
the central bank mandate. Costs for the government of holding an excess of financial assets in the 
form of central bank shares typically result from the almost inevitable discount that central bank 
return on assets exhibit over the financing cost of government debt. The discount of stable central 
bank return on assets reflects its variety of functions, the composition of its assets portfolio and a 
myriad of institutional factors systematically discussed in the first part of the paper.  Finally, the 
costs of central bank financial distress are quantified as the lost benefits of central bank 
independence. Notice that unlike Basel like models, this approach is not a percentile-based one. As 
a consequence of this, the capitalization solution exhibits decreasing returns to scale on risk. 
Among the issues pertaining to the risk-return profile of central bank assets discussed in the first 
part of the paper, the reverting behaviour of risk of fx holdings and the one of government debt held 
to maturity decisively shape the conclusions of the paper. Namely, the (statistical) validity of the 
uncovered interest parity theory defines a short-term volatility and a (lower) medium-term one that 
shape the risk profile of the central bank. Consequently, a wedge emerges between short-term and 
medium-term central bank financial vulnerability. Market value accounting schemes exaggerate 
such wedge and impose a premium on short-term central bank capital over the medium-term one. 
The argument can similarly be applied to holdings to maturity of government debt. In other words, 
the capital buffer to be held by a central bank should optimally be inside the confines of a band. 
Typically, the “shadow” base of capital that central bank exhibit, i.e. earnings from note issuance, 
suffices to cover even against short-term shocks if profits can be appropriated by the central bank. 
However, such solution transfers the excess of volatility to the government. Moreover, central bank 
financial independence calls for control on the central bank side on how to allocate its profits so that 
an acceptable level of solvency can be safeguarded. 
As a consequence of these arguments, together with the capitalization proposal put forward in the 
paper, the elements of a dividend distribution policy are delineated which would lead to optimal 
consistency between financial strength preservation and entitlement over profits. Contingent 
capitalization solutions based on institutional arrangements should be equivalent in terms of their 
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economic protection to the outright capitalization one. The dividends distribution scheme derived 
exhibits two features that depart from conventional practice. 
Firstly, profits available for distribution do not necessarily encompass all income generated so that 
the capitalization optimum is feasible. Notice that unlike what happens with general purpose 
accounting principles aimed at serving decision taking by managers and shareholders, the very 
definition on an independent central bank, based on the negation of government involvement in its 
operations, supports the construction of a distributable profit metrics that leaves no margin for the 
erosion of central bank strength.  
Secondly, the suggested scheme follows a smoothing pattern. Such feature, already practiced by 
some central banks, arises out of two reasons. Firstly, central banks’ profit smoothing is neutral 
with incumbent governments.  Secondly, and more importantly, smoothing is consistent with the 
assumed natural cycles of central banks’ earnings generation. In other words, quantity and quality 
of profits considerations recommend profit smoothing. 
Smoothing has implicitly been practiced by central banks resorting to historical or cost-amortized 
accounting schemes. The recent prominence of smoothing as some extraordinary accounting device 
has emerged out of the trend towards market value accounting benchmarks. Certainly, market value 
accounting leads to higher levels of transparency and accountability on the financial domain. 
However, these benefits must be pondered against the premium on capital that it places, due to the 
short-term artificial vulnerability that it may unleash. In addition, the direct link between monetary 
policy actions and central bank financial position enabled by such accounting convention may also 
operate perversely on central bank decision making. 
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Annex 1 
Combining tables 1 and 2, containing respectively the balance sheet and the P & L of a central bank 
it is immediate to obtain 
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Annex 2
The contrast between the short-term and medium-term risk profile of a buy-and-hold strategy on a 
government debt security is striking. Although prices may oscillate wildly on the short-term, there 
is a well defined drift for the clean price of the security from the outset. Whenever accounting 
conditions for buy-and-hold investments are satisfied, investment-to-maturity accounting allows 
removing short-term risk. However, held-to-maturity accounting criteria are strict ones and, more 
importantly, they can not be satisfied by most central banks’ financial assets almost by definition. 
For example, IAS-39 requires a positive intent to hold the financial asset to maturity before it can be 
classified in the held-to-maturity portfolio. Central banks commitment to elastically provide 
liquidity sets a profound limitation for them to benefit from the smooth accounting regime provided 
by amortized cost procedures and, consequently, from an ensuing lower level of risks. 
The alternative categories envisaged by IAS-39 to classify financial holdings are held-for-trading 
portfolio and available-for-sale assets. Generally speaking, central banks’ government debt holdings 
cannot be reputed as assets belonging to a trading portfolio. By definition, a trading portfolio is one 
intended to generate short-term gains through buys and sales, something that clashes with the 
essence of central banks’ mandate.  The only remaining accounting category is the 
available-for-sale assets one. 
The available-for-sale category may fit the intent of holdings of government debt by some central 
banks.  The option is available under this category to defer unrealised gains and losses on bond 
holdings and to recycle them to the income statement when assets are sold. Thus, smoothing is 
effectively allowed for government debt holdings in the domestic currency. However, in meantime 
fair value accounting must be applied. Notice that foreign exposure does not benefit of any 
smoothing mechanism. 
Available for sale accounting thus fits the potential and real activism of some central banks in the 
interest rate market as frequently expressed in terms of benchmarking strategies around a duration 
target. Management activism is usually expressed in terms of an admissible band for the portfolio 
duration around the central target. Benchmarking trades thus obey two basic motives: rebalancing 
transactions and interest rate bets. 
The central bank capitalization model in section 5 has assumed for expositional convenience that 
government debt does not affect central bank financial vulnerability. This assumption amounts to 
accept a buy-and-hold investment strategy, i.e. one where recovery of principal is guaranteed. Let 
us briefly discuss how a benchmarking strategy based on zero-coupon bonds sequentially matching 
(i.e. at successive rebalancing dates) the duration target can be fitted into the formalism. 
It is interesting to start with the following observation. If the yield curve happened to evolve across 
time in accordance with its shape at the inception of the benchmarking strategy, the return of that 
strategy over a horizon equal to the duration target equals the return of one consisting of rollovers of 
investments to maturity (i.e. to the target duration). It is important to emphasize that the comparison 
term is a dynamic one, a sequence of investments to maturity. In a real situation, risk and yield 
pick-up over the one rollover strategy arise from the effect of discontinuous rebalancing and from 
success or failure of bets on yield curve movements. Notice that medium term risk from a 
benchmarking strategy on government bonds enters problem (2) in section 5 in differential terms 
over the risk of a buy-and-hold one. As a hint that medium term risk is lower than short-term one, 
notice that under one-off shocks to the yield curve the return from pure rebalancing effects amounts 
exactly the same to the one obtained from following the rollover strategy of buy-and-hold 
investments. In the most general case, the risk add-on of a benchmarking strategy over a repeated 
buy-and-hold one is certainly not a straightforward expression. However, its size is still lower than 
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the short-term risk. However, an institutional consequence of the permanent activism in the market 
is the inability to qualify for amortized cost accounting, i.e. an exposure to artificial risks not unlike 
the ones analyzed in the main text for foreign assets holdings. 
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